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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: DEFINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE
President Ronald Reagan's second term was a failure
because the communications staff, led by Patrick Buchanan,
promoted an agenda too conservative to maintain the
popularity of the president's policies with the American
people. Though public opinion polls furnished the president
with high approval ratings during the third quarter of his
presidency, this personal popularity did not translate into
successful passage of legislation. In fact, Reagan
accomplished much more in terms of real policy during the
first term, a time when his approval ratings were depressed
by a poor economy.
Reagan's successful first term can be measured in
terms of the number of his proposals that passed through
Congress, his ability to lead the so-called "Reagan
Revolution, " and his influence on foreign policy. Early
legislative triumphs helped Reagan to forge a base of
enduring popularity and to stake out a position of power,
which were imperative after campaigning in an election that
failed to enthuse voters. Many voters also admitted to
pollsters that, even though they liked Reagan and had higher
regard for him than President Carter, they had trouble
accepting the new president's principal beliefs. Reagan and
his first-term staff had to frame competently the major
campaign issues for public consumption and deftly deal with
Congress because winning entry to the White House is only
1
the first step in the policy- implementation process.
Controlling the agenda, realizing domestic policy, and
fulfilling campaign promises could assure Reagan the
capacity to determine his own course of action in
Washington, D.C.
The 1980 election demonstrated that the country
remained disappointed in Carter's leadership from both an
economic and foreign policy standpoint. Reagan presented an
economic plan that he assured voters would strengthen the
economy and end its inflationary tendencies under Carter.
Less significant to the Reagan victory, though indicating a
similar mood among voters, was the hostage crisis in Iran.
The plight of those in captivity made Carter a weaker
president and seemed to elevate Reagan's stature:
Those who win presidential elections
are those who fulfill the role
expectations of the American public.
And role expectations have very little
to do with political issues or
policies
.
1
As James David Barber, author of The Presidential Character ,
posits, a president enters the White House needing to
reassure voters, maintain themes of progress and action, and
provide a sense of legitimacy. These are the three
components of what Barber calls a "climate of expectations."
"Besides the power mix in Washington, the President has to
deal with a national climate of expectations, the
predominant needs thrust up to him by the people."" The
basic role expectation voters placed on Reagan, then, was to
make them better off (progress) and return their confidence
2
(legitimacy) in American institutions. But success for
Reagan, or any president, cannot be evaluated only in terms
of what the public anticipates will be accomplished. While
Reagan could renew the hopes of Americans by lifting them
from the poor economy and freeing the hostages, his position
as chief executive and party leader demanded that other
elements of his conservative philosophy come to fruition.
Shrinking the size of the federal government and its
entitlement programs while increasing the military' s budget
were Reagan's major goals. Wilbur Edel, a liberal critic of
the administration, portrays most of Reagan' s first term as
a failure because of the effects the president's policies
had on lower class citizens. But this is not the set of
criteria on which either Reagan's successes or failures will
be appraised in this thesis. The individual merits of
policies need not be judged except in terms of how they
helped or hindered the president from gaining power and
influence. Therefore, the successes and failures examined
here will focus only on the abilities of Reagan and his
staffs to pass legislation and maintain high public support.
By maximizing his use of the media through public
appeals, Reagan greatly enhanced his standing as the most
important and powerful political figure in the United
States. This strategy, however, did not guarantee immediate
success unless he had the cooperation of those in Congress
that he hoped to influence. According to presidential
scholar Richard Neustadt
:
3
Because our monarch' s formal powers are
so largely shared, his personal
effectiveness (actual power) is in the
same degree at risk, dependent on
consent from other sharers
.
3
But, in fact, most of Reagan's popular appeals in the first
term could not be effectively blunted by his opponents.
Many Democrats felt the pressure to side with the president
and give him their consent. House Democrats went along with
Reagan's agenda because they feared being defeated later at
the ballot box. However, by the middle of the second term
these other "sharers" were more willing to resist the
president. Their concerns about losing faded as the White
House became more ideological and less able to influence the
electorate
.
The second term, then, can be characterized as a
failure because Reagan was unable to advance policy despite
his large victory in the 1984 election. The staff members
seemed to ignore the lack of passion Americans held for such
key domestic and foreign policies as financially supporting
the military efforts of the Contras, lowering the deficit,
reducing taxes, and building a space-based missile defense
system. While it is true many of these goals had some
public support (as they still do today)
,
it was incumbent
upon the president and his communications people to firm up
the popularity of these issues to overcome the more
determined House leadership and a new Democratic majority in
the Senate that arrived in 1986. Thus it was possible that
Reagan's objectives might not be accomplished without
returning to a bargaining system with Congress.
4
In this paper I will examine how a new set of role
expectations, a decline in Reagan's personal abilities,
the institutional politics of the mid- 1980 's played key
the failures Buchanan might have avoided.
and
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW: WHERE DID THINGS GO WRONG?
Autobiographies by presidential staff members Michael
Deaver, Edwin Meese, Peggy Noonan, Donald Regan, and Larry
Speakes contribute to the collective understanding of the
Reagan administration by discussing the successes and
failures during the periods of their employ. However, the
two key players in the communications effort, directors
David Gergen and Patrick Buchanan, have not yet written
accounts of their service. This means that the going-public
strategies they implemented and their influence over policy
are best described by second-hand sources.
The personal histories written by Reagan staffers,
coupled with the analyses by political writers, agree that
the second term was less productive at passing policy, with
tax reform being the only major legislative success. In
fact, some of these writers make a convincing argument that
the first year of Reagan's eight in Washington marked his
greatest legislative achievements. But legislative
achievement is not a complete measure of a president's
successes, especially during a second term. It should be
remembered that presidents often struggle in second terms,
finding it harder to pass their programs and almost
impossible to match the good feelings of the first term.
After all, a successful first term is what allows a
president to procure an additional term.
Poor second terms have dominated the presidencies of
the television age. President Eisenhower faced a recession
7
from 1957 to 1959 and failed to take a stand on the evolving
civil rights movement. President Johnson, after the
legislative triumphs of the Great Society program, became
deeply involved in the Vietnam War and had to deal with
social unrest on the homefront during his second term,
though it was the only term he served for which he was
elected on his own right. President Nixon's agenda was
hampered by Watergate and the resignation of his vice
president
.
Reagan's conservative philosophy, though, appeared to
be different. His resounding victory in the 1984
presidential election and the incomplete Reagan Revolution
seemed to assure that he would dominate the politics of the
mid-1980's. But many of his ideas never came to fruition
and Congress began passing its own legislation once the
Senate returned to Democratic control in 1986. How could
this happen to a president seemingly at the peak of his
power? A good place to start is in the second term'
s
leadership
.
Reagan received much criticism throughout his
presidency for not controlling his staff, despite the fact
that he was in charge of all administration officials.
Meese claims this criticism was unfair and untrue. But
after the Iran-Contra scandal, it became even easier to lay
blame on the president. The secret deals - swapping arms
for hostages - the argument goes, would not have happened
under a responsible president who actually oversaw his
staff. Reagan was wounded politically by the scandal.
8
Adding to the lack of presidential supervision, White House
operations did not run as smoothly under Chief of Staff
Donald Regan as they had under James Baker, Reagan's first
chief of staff.
The organization of Reagan's staff was critical to his
presidency because the White House staff and members of the
Office of Communications fall under the control of both the
president and chief of staff. But often the communications
director will report directly to the chief of staff,
bypassing any consultation with the president. Regan was as
concerned as James Baker about retaining the president's
popularity, but Regan was also determined to implement the
conservative policies that he believed Baker had failed to
enact. Yet Regan had far less ability and understanding of
how to develop policy, and he did not prepare an agenda for
Reagan until August 1985. The action plan Regan drew up
would attack congressional spending, fight for tax reform,
encourage Reagan to use the veto, and have a series of
meetings with Mikhail Gorbachev.
The two major second-term staff changes took place at
the chief of staff position and at the communications
director post. Peggy Noonan, Reagan's principal
speechwriter
,
scapegoats Regan, who she says was supposed to
be a White House leader and create policy for Buchanan to
make public. Noonan quotes Michael Horowitz, counsel to the
Office of Management and Budget from 1981 to 1985, as
saying
:
9
[A] f ter four years the best people were
tired. And Regan came along, and he
was temperamentally unsuited and
unsuited in terms of experience
. And
he had second-rate people around him
and a Cabinet older than the
Politburo
.
1
At the same time, she eloquently defends Buchanan, a man for
whom she had great respect and admiration. Buchanan could
not work in a Regan system which created paralysis. But her
arguments for Buchanan do not always hold up because she is
reluctant to be critical of his work or his inability to
work in harmony with Regan.
Indeed, Regan and Buchanan clashed on the conservative
content of Reagan's 1985 State of the Union address. Noonan
provides a unique explanation for Buchanan's later failures,
which, she says, had nothing to do with making errors in
judgment. She believes that the American people were no
longer listening to the president's words because they
already knew his policies and political views. Buchanan had
to give up on his hope that Reagan would lead the
conservative revolution.
I guess my Pat Theory now is: He knew
that after six or seven years of a
Reagan presidency it didn't really
matter what words Reagan was saying,
because no matter what he said, people
were hearing the same thing. 2
So Reagan remained a dynamic speaker, but he was unable to
increase the appeal of his policies. This is borne out in
the polls.
There is scant literature that describes the minutiae
of the work done by the Office of Communications, but
10
Buchanan's comments speak volumes about how he intended to
use the office as a place for policy development. While the
office is closely monitored by the chief of staff, the
office can, as Buchanan proved, be run independently from
the chief of staff's oversight and work in opposition to his
desired goals.
Frequent attempts were made by Regan, Noonan says, to
separate words from policy. This type of control was more
inhibiting than the "editorial board" approach used in the
first term. "It was a constant struggle over speeches, a
constant struggle over who was in charge and what view would
prevail and which group would triumph ." 3 This infighting
was even more damaging because the clarity of policy had
already been diminished by the lack of a clear-cut agenda.
The differences in these two men's political beliefs may not
have been vast, but they were sharply divided on the proper
approach to passing policy and the influence communications
officials should have. Buchanan must be held accountable
for his reluctance to let Regan do the job of long-term
planning and overseeing the president's agenda.
11
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CHAPTER III
REAGAN'S CHOICE: GO PUBLIC OR BARGAIN
A. Explaining the Strategies
Public communication has become an important source of
presidential power. Presidents who effectively appeal both
to the American people and to the media are apt to be more
successful in making policy. Even those presidents who
refuse to use the highest office as a "bully pulpit" are in
a position of strength every time they make a speech, hold a
news conference, or appear in the presence of cameras. This
fact is not lost on the chief of staff or the communications
director, both of whom have a great interest in making
decisions about the president's communications.
A modern president can choose from two approaches to
pass through Congress the issues on which he based his
campaign. The more common in recent years has been the
"going public" strategy, which uses the combined skills of
the president and his communications staff to directly
address the American people. The "going public" strategy is
an attempt to get people to support policies at the core of
the presidential agenda: "A president must not only follow
public opinion but most often attempt to lead and generate
public support for a wide range of policy positions ." 1
Hence the president's need for this communications approach
in the modern era.
The other method, frequently used in the past, is to
deal with legislators behind closed doors. While bargaining
is a more time-consuming and demanding process that may
13
require twisting arms and compromising political beliefs, it
can often yield better, more consistent results for a
president. Though the Reagan administration used both
strategies, especially in the first year, the president
eventually proved more adept at going public. Thus he
sacrificed much of his original flexibility, concentrating
on defeating Congress in the public opinion arena. From the
time he took office, it was evident that the former
Hollywood actor was a better communicator than many of his
predecessors. Not all politicians, and indeed not all
presidents, have been endowed with Reagan's ability to
communicate easily with the public. But his communicating
skill may have created a lackadaisical attitude conducive to
the atmosphere for his second-term failings.
Hiring staff members trained in public relations is
essential for any modern president, especially one as
concerned about his daily appearances as Reagan was:
Reagan's staff, as media professionals,
recognized that the public has less and
less of a historical memory. This
requires a daily concern rather than a
long-term perspective for impression
management . 2
The strategy of going public hinges on rhetorical appeals by
the president and a reliable public-relations effort. This
has resulted in an increase in the communications director'
s
influence
.
Selling policies to the American people, controlling
the legislative agenda and bureaucracy, and remaining
popular with the electorate are all part of going public.
14
This may or may not be a lethal combination for a
president's opponents:
When the people are behind him, he can
prevail against any of the lesser
publics - the pressure groups with
their lobbyists and their Congressional
spokesmen who dare oppose him
.
3
To fulfill his goal of overcoming opposition by using the
passions of the public, Reagan assembled the largest
communications unit in White House history. His direct
appeals reguired numerous speechwriters
,
selected for their
specific expertise in a policy area, their political views,
or simply their ability to write well. The writers' prose
could elevate a policy argument from mere rational discourse
to passionate and persuasive speech. Reagan's agenda, which
included rolling back entitlements and other domestic
programs, lowering taxes, and increasing defense spending,
could have been passed without a large communications staff,
but the task would have been more daunting. His eventual
dependence on the communications staff, as well as on the
Legislative Strategy Group, would hurt him later when the
communications director and chief of staff did not see eye
to eye
.
With the existing conflict between Regan and Buchanan
and the signs of strong support for Reagan in the polls,
traditional bargaining - the give and take between the White
House and Congressional actors - did not seem as if it would
be needed or be able to serve a purpose. But Reagan, who
was so successful at the going-public tactic during the
first term, was unable to marshal support despite using the
15
same appeals again. The personal popularity of a president,
apparently, will not always transcend unpopular policy.
This is especially so if people are already content, as many
people were by 1985.
Though the constantly expanding reach of the
electronic media has furnished other politicians with
opportunities to take center stage at the national level, in
the 1980's the president, despite his conservative beliefs,
had most of the advantages. Being a Republican in
Washington has often meant fearing a hostile press and
Congress
,
which may have prompted the Reagan administration
to seek a role model of Republican success. The Reagan
administration's communications efforts and promotional
techniques in time came to resemble those first employed by
President Richard Nixon. When Reagan's first term began,
however, there was no indication that the communications
efforts would be closely patterned after Nixon's, despite
the fact that Reagan was succeeding a president who failed
to address his communications problems or to respond to the
"malaise" he saw. Though the Reagan presidency did not
begin with a strong Office of Communications, his first four
years witnessed a skillful use of the office that was a
return to the office's original intention. Reagan
successfully "copied the Nixon practice of a tightly
regimented line-of -the-day coupled with limited press access
and direct appeals to the people." 4 David Gergen was
instrumental in making this happen.
16
But unlike Nixon, Reagan and his staff did not
casually assault the press when they felt its members were
biased against them. Reagan employed a press secretary who
tried to be as open and cooperative as possible because
managing the news and controlling its content required that
the press be the administration's ally. This lack of
friction freed the administration to concentrate on policy
development and to ensure that both Cabinet and
communications officials were pursuing a unified political
agenda
.
IL History of the Office of Communications
The Office of Communications, added to the Executive
Office of the White House in 1969, has become instrumental
in the process of passing domestic policy through Congress.
Created by Nixon, the office was intended as a way to
maintain the successes realized on the presidential campaign
trail. 5 In Spin Control
, John Anthony Maltese describes
the changes made during the Reagan years that were tied to
the president's expanded going-public strategies.
Public promotion of the presidency is mostly a
twentieth century phenomenon that matured when television
became the dominant medium. After the first Kennedy-Nixon
debate in 1960, the American public's reactions confirmed
the powerful role television could play in influencing
opinions. Nuances visible on the television screen - such
as facial expressions, attire, and make-up - could not be
observed by those listening on radio. This caused a
17
difference m opinion as to who won the debate, depending on
whether the person had watched or listened. Prior to
Kennedy's use of this evolving technology, public promotion
was not as powerful a tool. President Woodrow Wilson, for
example, tried to use public-relations techniques to promote
the League of Nations. His efforts failed, however, when he
was unable to garner enough support from the Senate to
ratify the treaty and allow the United States to join. Some
critics blame his use of public relations for the failure
because it was an effort to manipulate the legislature.
Forty years of advances in television technology gave
Kennedy the impetus to have his press conferences, which
revealed his youthfulness and energy, carried live to the
nation. He also established ties with media outside of
Washington by granting numerous interviews with hometown
newspapers and local television stations. But public
relations at the presidential level was still in its
infancy
:
Before Nixon, most coordination of
public relations activities were
carried out in an ad hoc manner or were
simply left to chance. Since then, the
Office of Communications has become an
indispensable part of planning and
implementing the strategies of the
modern public presidency . 6
As promotional ideas acquired a more sophisticated form, the
policy-making process became more complicated. This in turn
signalled the need for public-relations gimmickry, or the
advance of style over substance. Reagan perfected this by
tapping into the short -attention spans of Americans. But
18
this is a shallow analysis which does not give the public
enough credit for separating sound policy from an
influential communicator. "The result has been great
emphasis on television-acceptable personalities for
candidates at all levels." 7 This represents a problem for
the American people only if they are reluctant to listen to
all arguments about an issue. Good policy is still
achievable even in an era dominated by sound bites.
The increased use of rhetoric and the greater number
of those involved in presidential communications operations
occurred at virtually the same time as the presidential
campaign season expanded. As winning primaries became
essential to capture a party's nomination, candidates had to
make more direct appeals to the general electorate. Indeed,
"How the public sees a candidate's personal qualities may
play a large part in winning or losing elections." 8
Candidates no longer had to make deals in the smoke-filled
back rooms of party headquarters, but instead had to broaden
their acceptability to more than the most dedicated party
members. Yet while television's prominence gave candidates
a greater ability to communicate on the national level, the
intimacy with the audience was lost.
As Reagan entered office in 1981, the White House was
still the dominant player in the president ial - legislative
relationship, despite the impact of Watergate. The Office
of Communications, which went virtually unaffected by
Watergate, helped to make a White House-centered system of
19
government possible and expanded the range of what the staff
could accomplish:
The Office of Communications had the
potential to be a particularly
effective tool of presidential power
since it could be used to increase the
president's internal as well as
external control over the policy-making
process
.
9
By formally combining all communications, the use of the
media could be maximized to mold public opinion and
highlight support for administration programs. The Office
of Communications was to continue activities already being
performed by the overburdened press secretary, such as
advertising the administration' s viewpoint and preparing a
long-range plan for success in dealing with the media.
While other presidents had understood the need to use media
for promotional purposes, Nixon's appointment of personal
friend Herbert Klein to the post was a direct attempt to
capture the media. "Klein's management of television and his
links with local media would serve to institutionalize a
means of going public ." 10 Henceforth, presidents would
have at their disposal another option in the policy
development process.
Media commentators at the time saw the communications
office as being no more than an ideological tool to advocate
the administration's policies. Author Joe McGinnis referred
to the office's creation as a political move by Nixon to
ready his policies for sale to the American people. The
major concern about the office was the potential that "the
packaging of policies for public consumption may become more
20
important than the policies themselves." 11 Constructive
and useful policy could be sacrificed solely to procure
public acceptance.
The function of external communications, at its most
basic, is to get the word out to the public. The press
secretary, overseeing the Press Office, sends out the daily
information the president's advisers want reported in the
nation's major newspapers and viewed on the network news.
Press conferences are a viable method to inform the media on
a wide variety of subject matter on a daily basis. Long-
range planning is conducted under the auspices of the Office
of Communications. The Office of Communications under
Reagan was responsible for pursuing three goals that made it
distinct from the Press Office:
long-term public relations planning,
the dissemination of the ' line-of - the-
day' to officials throughout the
executive branch, and the circumvention
of the White House press corps through
the orchestration of direct appeals to
the people. 12
Reagan performed this last element by opting to have few
press conferences and by bringing his unfiltered arguments
directly to the American people. In the first term, Reagan
held only 26 press conferences. 13
The basic difference between the independent offices
is best summed up by Maltese: "the Press Office is primarily
reactive, the Office of Communications is primarily
proactive." 14 Promoting the president's agenda, scripting
his speeches, and defining his policies have historically
been the communications unit's primary functions: "Whereas
21
the Press Office was responsible for dealing with reporters'
daily concerns, the Office of Communications was charged
with mapping a long-range media strategy." 15 The process
of developing and advancing policy was modified once face-
to-fsce bargaining with Congress was downgraded. As the
ability to circumvent Congress grew, there was less need to
have mutually acceptable policy.
This is an emphatic departure from the political
lessons learned from earlier scholarship on the relationship
between Congress and the president. In Richard Neustadt's
influential Presidential Power
, a study first published in
1960 that examined the relationship between the two bodies,
the power to bargain is referred to as the most significant
presidential tool. But in later editions Neustadt
acknowledged that he had not correctly forecast presidential
dependence on their staffs that began with Kennedy. This
changed the dynamics of the relationship between the
president and the legislature because the president became a
direct representative of the people, though he was not
necessarily blessed with a mandate. Even with this
analysis, Neustadt could probably not have foreseen a
president such as Reagan who remained distant from Congress,
rarely bargained with its members, and still succeeded, for
a period, in Washington.
C. Chancres Made bv Reagan
Selling policy became the task of the Office of
Communications because the first administration relied on a
22
combination of public pressure and bargaining to influence
Congress. But the Office of Communications both helped and
hindered Reagan's ability to craft policy initiatives. In
1981, the office's strategies of appealing to the people
worked well. ABC News polls that April suggested Reagan's
tactics were succeeding: 64 percent supported the
president s proposed spending cuts and 67 percent favored
his tax cuts. 16 These numbers came despite concerns that
cuts to entitlement programs might be forthcoming. As the
alternative to bargaining, however, Reagan used the going-
public strategy almost exclusively after the first year.
Going public was a natural fit for Reagan. His public
speaking skills were always top-notch when speeches were
prepared for him. Reagan's comfort in front of the camera
made it a simple decision for his advisers to schedule
staged television events. This can, however, be a dangerous
method to employ on a regular basis, because it expands the
staff's workload and might be used for the most trivial
items on the agenda. " [T] he commitment to speak precedes
the knowledge of any issue to speak about, often causing
staff to find or create an issue for the speech." 17 Even
when significant policy did not exist, communications
officials ensured that Reagan continued to speak at myriad
functions. This only became a bigger problem with the
second term's unpopular agenda.
The status of Reagan's presidency from 1984 to 1988
was, in large part, determined by Buchanan's office and its
antagonistic relationship with Regan. Buchanan pushed the
23
communications office into uncharted territory by trying to
brand his conservatism on policy. But Buchanan and Regan
shared a common aversion to bargaining, since they believed
the first administration had too often compromised Reagan's
original goals.
Whether or not his 1980 campaign promises were indeed
compromised, Reagan's was a presidency whose successes and
failures were directly linked to how well the communications
were working. The eight years Reagan spent in Washington
expanded the use of televised public appeals to an
unprecedented level. Reagan's access to television, despite
his disdain for press conferences, was the most substantial
of any modern president. And he is appropriately credited
with being the first president to use all available public-
relations resources. As The New York Times writer Hedrick
Smith observed:
Nixon knew what Reagan proved: the
enormous power of television in the
hands of a skillful president. Reagan
was the first president of the
television age to turn the power of
media leadership into the enactment of
his program. 18
Reagan's love for the job was genuine so persuading the
public was his forte. The presidency was just another
acting role perfectly suited to his talents. In addition,
Reagan seemed to enjoy the spotlight that the president's
involvement in world affairs gave him. "The Presidency is a
place for men of politics. But by no means is it a place
for every politician." 19 Reagan was naturally endowed with
the skill to use rhetoric and tell a good story. During his
24
first four years in the White House, Reagan was referred to
alternately as "the Great Communicator" and the "teflon"
president, the latter a term originated by liberal
representative Patricia Schroeder, D-Colorado, for his
remarkable ability to deflect controversy and criticism.
Reagan was such a likable politician that he probably could
have handled much of his own imagemaking.
Reagan s drive and ambition, coupled with the pleasure
he got from the job, may have helped him to remain
comfortable in Washington's often hostile climate. The
personality of a president can have an effect on policy
outcomes, according to Neustadt
. Reagan's governing style
took after his own demeanor, but his speeches contained
point -by-point analyses:
Rather than the substance of detailed
scrutiny and negotiations, policy
questions become overly simplified and
stylized to satisfy the cognitive
requirements of a largely inattentive
national audience . 20
Gergen modelled his communications work after Klein,
remembering to remain as politically independent as the post
allowed. Klein urged the departments to make greater use of
the media. For instance, a "surrogates" program was
designed for use during the election years that saw local
officials friendly to the administration speaking on behalf
of the president's policy. Klein also cultivated
congressional groups that would stand behind the president
on key domestic policy issues, saving precious time when the
bargaining process was required.
25
Going public is often a limited endeavor. The work
needed to promote an issue will depend on the importance it
has in the administration's agenda, its viability with the
American people, and its chance of succeeding in a hostile
Congress. "Obviously, mobilization of public support is
much easier when revolved around a potent political
symbol." 21 Such a symbol could be in the guise of a
national security concern or a fundamental need for the
long-term health of the country. But political issues that
are this pressing will rarely require the use of
communications experts. Reagan's 1981 budget was an
important issue that required careful, coordinated planning.
As noted above, good policy does not necessarily have to be
popular with the American people. Going public, though, is
an attempt to raise the level of its popularity.
The "primetime" presidency makes support for tax
increases or cuts in social programs more palatable, but it
can also change the rhetoric: "Public opinion is more
important than political persuasion... Presidential
leadership today is charismatic rather than
programmatic." 22 But policies are still important to a
president's success in the office and the maintenance of
coalitions. "Skills of public performance are more
important than the skills of management." 23 The attitudes
of voters, however, will require that a president achieve
his policy if he has any hopes of remaining popular.
Nevertheless, there are some political costs that must
be weighed. Public appeals often weaken a president and can
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impair the relationship between the legislative bodies and
chief executive designed by the Founders. The ability to go
public may give the president a greater chance to gain
influence. In Federal i s
t
50, Madison writes:
It may be contended, perhaps, that
instead of occasional appeals to the
people, which are liable to the
objections urged against them,
periodical appeals are the proper and
adequate means of preventing and
correcting infractions of the
Constitution
.
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Some scholars, however, believe the use of public appeals
weakens the American political institutions by damaging the
relationship of checks and balances. "The continual
attempts to mobilize the public through the use of personal
or charismatic power delegit imizes constitutional or normal
authority." 25 Ironically, however, problems can arise in a
presidency like Reagan's which was so dependent on public
communication
.
Making the choice between bargaining and going public
often appears to be easy, but perhaps presidents should give
it more thought:
The built-in conflict between the
President and Congress, assured by
checks and balances, leaves the
President dependent upon broad public
support as his most powerful means of
bending Congress to his will.
Fortunately, with the stakes so high,
the Presidential office is endowed with
superior opportunities for reaching the
public . 26
Reagan was not similar to past presidents who had enjoyed
bargaining with Congress and could often succeed doing it.
Because the Republican party did not control the House of
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Representatives, Reagan's advisers understood that public
communications had to be successful to go over the heads of
congressional leaders. This helped in weakening the
resistance put up in the first term: "Many in Congress were
also in awe of Reagan' s mastery of television and seeming
domination of the media." 27 Former Merrill Lynch employee
Henkel, who replaced Deaver as the chief advance man
for Reagan, told one writer: "We are marketing; we are
trying to mold public opinion by marketing strategies.
That's what communications is all about." 28 This is "going
public" in its most elementary form.
Congressional resistance to approving more of Reagan's
agenda in the second term was not wholly unexpected
considering the inferior status the legislative branch had
willingly taken during the first term. Democrats studied
the polls and saw through Reagan's high approval ratings to
the people's discontent with his agenda, which was confirmed
by the results of the 1986 mid-term elections. Reagan's
reliance on the attitudes of the people meant he had no
Congressional liaison on which to fall back, which could
have paved the way for a better second term.
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CHAPTER IV
FIRST TERM
Before we can understand the failures of the second
term, it is important to examine the first term to see how
the administration worked well and avoided controversy, even
though it was argued by some that the scope of the agenda
was deliberately limited.
A. Winning the Election
Reagan had proved to be an able campaigner when he ran
against President Gerald Ford in the 1976 primaries. His
success in that campaign assured him frontrunner status
among Republicans vying for the White House in 1980. After
winning the 1980 primaries, Reagan was fortunate that the
campaign's rhetoric and debates with his opponents were
dominated by domestic policy. Economic issues, for
instance, can directly affect the daily lives of the
American public by changing spending habits and the quality
of life. Reagan downplayed the social issues, a weak area
for him, and turned his concentration to the economy. The
reasons for moving to economic issues were obvious: Reagan
had a huge advantage in public opinion over Carter on the
economy and on such intangibles as leadership, decisiveness,
and conviction. Carter had an edge on the social issues,
which included his support for abortion rights and the Equal
Rights Amendment.
Both candidates understood that the campaign was
unlikely to be won on foreign affairs. Foreign policy has
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often been conducted in a similar manner no matter who
resides in the White House: " [C] ompared with foreign and
economic affairs, there has been much less coherence over
the years in the way in which government policy has been
made and carried out in domestic affairs." 1 Foreign policy
is also an area where presidents have more flexibility in
making demands on Congress because legislators are unlikely
to have as much knowledge on specific policy. Carter
portrayed Reagan as a war monger, but it had little effect
on how voters cast their votes. Eight polls, conducted
separately by CBS News/The New York Times and NBC
News/Associated Press, found that between 29 and 32 percent
of the public believed Reagan would start a war if elected
president 2
; yet Reagan won.
The candidate's victories in his own party's primaries
and then the presidential election furnished him with
momentum as he prepared to enter the Oval Office. But
Reagan understood that he, like all other incoming
presidents of the modern era, faced high public
expectations. The demands placed on presidents have
increased in union with the greater media exposure for all
politicians: " [C] ontemporary growth in public expectations
of the presidency seem directly related to the growth of
mass media." 3 Reagan hoped to turn the expansive mass
media to his own advantage and meet the public expectations
promptly
.
By winning the presidential election, the candidate
has proved that he is a successful campaigner. But this is
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often not enough to guarantee his success as a politician.
"As an occupant of a political office, a president must
possess and exercise traditional politician's skills of
communication and persuasion." 4 The length of modern
campaigns does help the president to hone some of the
communication skills he will need in the White House. It
does not necessarily follow from his victory, though, that
he will have the ability to use popular rhetoric to promote
the office and gain legislative success.
Controlling Congress and the legislative agenda is a
demand placed upon all incoming presidents. Having a
mandate from the people or holding a majority in the
Congress can make it an easier task to make the campaign-
trail promises reality. But even a president who has
support from the people and who owns majorities in the House
and Senate does not necessarily pass legislation without
struggles and bargaining.
Reagan entered office appearing as inflexible with his
demands as any recent president even though his coalition
looked fragile. There was also no mandate from the
electorate to pursue conservative policies. So despite
Reagan's victory against an incumbent, it seemed unlikely
that he would be able to succeed in Washington without
working side by side with Congress. According to James
David Barber, Americans in the 1980 election voted against
the ineffective Jimmy Carter rather than for the
conservative Ronald Reagan. 5 The election, in which Reagan
won 489 of the 538 electoral votes, did witness the lowest
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voter turnout in 32 years, as only 86 million voters, or 54
percent of the eligible electorate, cast ballots. The
voters who did vote, however, were giving Reagan a chance to
re-instill confidence in the presidency.
Reagan's task was made more difficult with the era of
divided government well in place. Though his party held a
53-47 advantage in the Senate after the 1980 elections, a
majority they would hold until 1986, Reagan, like his most
recent Republican predecessors, faced a House of
Representatives with 243 Democrats and just 192 Republicans.
The combination of the low turnout and the House Democrat
majority seemed to ensure that Reagan's congressional
opponents would stand against him to hamper his conservative
vision. But this did not happen, at least not immediately.
Instead, the president improved his power position by
convincing Congress that he, like other elected officials,
received a clear mandate from the public.
Broad themes were outlined by Reagan early in his 1980
campaign and further developed during the transition period
in sessions conducted under the auspices of the Legislative
Strategy Group (LSG) . This pre - inaugural preparation work,
coupled with Reagan's well-known political positions,
allowed his staff to mold policy that he would support and
later eloquently defend.
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IL Staffing the White Hourp
1. Finding Leadership
In the formal system that Reagan employed, translating
the electoral victory into a productive presidency was the
responsibility of the presidential advisers. Reagan would
depend on a strong chief of staff to initiate the decision
process. A president employing this management style has
the advantage of spending less time deciding which policy to
pursue and can give closer attention to a greater set of
issues. The major liabilities of using this management
style were Reagan's lack of interest in following the
development of policy and his refusal to monitor his staff.
"The credibility of Reagan's policies was shaken by the
credibility of his insistence not to know what they were." 6
And there was potential that Reagan could receive distorted
information which would allow staff members to develop
policy on their own.
Any concerns about Reagan's management style were
alleviated by the people he put in charge of his first term.
After the 1980 election, Michael Deaver conspired with James
Baker to prevent Edwin Meese, Reagan's campaign manager,
from becoming the chief of staff. While Baker had
experience as George Bush's campaign manager, Meese was
considered Reagan's closest friend from his days serving the
California governor. Instead of choosing his friend,
however, Reagan was persuaded to put the more moderate Baker
in the top position. The president then named Deaver his
deputy chief of staff and Meese his personal counselor.
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White House operations would be run by this so-called
"troika," a three-headed position peculiar to the Reagan
administration
.
Meese had hoped to use the chief
-of -staff position to
set Reagan's agenda, but he had to be content with oversight
of the National Security and Domestic Council staffs, which
gave the conservative little real power over policy.
Decisions made by the troika were determined by majority
votes, with Baker and Deaver often teaming up on the
counselor to the president. While it is often best for
conflict to remain outside the White House, the troika
encouraged frictions:
The system was built on mutual distrust
and, although no one said so, on the
premise of an impressionable president
vulnerable to whatever argument he
heard last
.
7
Fortunately for Reagan, Baker would maintain unity at the
highest levels of policy planning, something that his
successor, Donald Regan, found hard to do.
With the notable exception of Meese, who eventually
accepted his position as counselor to the president, the
staff was superbly unified in its goals during the first
term. This helped guide the administration through periods
of personal conflicts. The public agenda set forth by an
administration, Baker realized, must be adhered to by all
members of the president's team, including the high-level
staff, cabinet officers, and other executive branch
officials. This has the dual purpose of promoting
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cooperation and preventing the administration from losing
focus on its predetermined goals.
The organization of the upper-level staff determined
the political direction of the first term. Baker stayed the
moderate course by preventing Meese's ideas from gaining
acceptance in the White House. Meese, for example, wanted
the president to have multiple press secretaries, which
could have permitted him and other conservatives to become
equally prominent administration spokesmen. Baker, however,
wanted only one press secretary, so he denied Meese's
request, entrusting James Brady with the power of the
highest - ranking communications official.
Conflicts that normally arise among staff members were
kept to a minimum in the early Reagan years. Meese's anger
was pacified by his control over the Cabinet councils. "The
clarity of the Reagan domestic agenda is what maintained so
much unanimity among key administration players; he never
had a loyalty problem with his Cabinet." 8 Baker and Deaver
helped to protect Reagan's policies, which had been in the
public domain for more than 20 years, from getting stale,
polish his agenda, and smooth its rough edges for public
consumption. In doing so, however, conservatives felt,
whether correct or not, that the White House leadership had
changed Reagan's original mission.
While using public-relations techniques is important
to advance policy, most presidents have understood that a
two-pronged communications strategy is necessary in order to
be a successful president:
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To maintain control of the public
agenda, then, the White House must not
only minimize exposure of internal
conflict but also aggressively promote
the messages that it wants conveyed to
the American people
.
9
Baker could feel comfortable setting the agenda because
Reagan nearly always approved the consensus on policy
achieved in the Cabinet council meetings or through the
LSG's work. "Once agreement was achieved, he seemed to
accept whatever decision was reached as his own, and he
expected all parties to adopt the 'team' position." 10
Quality policy, Reagan believed, did not depend on the
number of options available to him, but rather the caliber
of those hired to do the job. In 1981, policy experts
helped him to avoid choosing between competing policies in
formulating the budget. This made it hard for Office of
Management and Budget Chairman David Stockman to convince
Reagan that he knew what was best for the Department of
Defense's budget when Reagan assumed Caspar Weinberger -
nicknamed "Cap the Knife" for his previous budget cutting
prowess - could handle the job of determining his
department's budget.
In a divided government, it is pivotal for the
administration to present a unified front to influence
Congress. This is what Stockman tried to bring to the
negotiating table. "Good interpersonal communication skills
will result in smoother staff operations, a better touch
with reality, and a more loyal staff." 11 The process by
which policy was formulated in this first year shows how
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control was exerted from the top of Reagan's chain of
command
.
This went against the traditional and more common view
of the president's role in policymaking, summarized by
Koenig: "The President prepares for decisions by absorbing
oral briefings and reading and pondering memoranda ." 12
Even when he examined policy, Reagan only read summaries of
what was being developed for him, usually put together by
advocates of the policy. This worked fine during the first
term because Reagan had capable staff members. But when the
competence of the staff declined in the second term, the
corresponding level of trust he placed in their work did
not. So the great passion Reagan held for his policies,
useful in communication, could often act as a double-edged
sword. Once Reagan came to believe in a proposal it was,
staff members later admitted, difficult to make him change
his mind.
At the beginning of the first term, the Press
Secretary's office was expected to be instrumental in the
public-relations work of the administration. Larry Speakes
and Kama Small were named Brady's deputy press secretaries,
but their roles were limited in scope and less public. The
formal structure had Brady reporting to Baker through Staff
Director David Gergen, and speechwriters reporting directly
to Gergen. The Office of Communications run by Frank
Ursamaro, however, began as an inferior entity. Long-term
planning was instead conducted by the combined talents of
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Gergen, Deaver, Ursamaro, presidential pollster Richard
Wirthlin, and Staff Secretary Richard Darman.
The more instantaneous political needs, such as the
line-of
-the-day, were effectively created in meetings
involving only upper-level staff. They designed their daily
schedule so that the president's agenda would be the first
released to the public. The troika would meet for a working
breakfast at 7:30 a.m. By 8:15 a.m., the line-of -the-day
would be set and the information would be passed on to
Gergen and Speakes
. Thirty minutes later, the president
would learn about the day's agenda. Reagan evidently did
not care that he was not setting his daily agenda. He
already had staff intelligently refining his broader themes.
This trust always had the potential to lead to
unsatisfactory results, but Baker's team usually did not
disappoint the chief executive.
The agenda was set in motion at Speakes' 9:15 a.m.
press briefing, giving the White House the lead on competing
agencies and taking away any chance that the president would
not be the day's policy- setter . Baker's efforts were
reinforced by his desire to have both internal and external
unity. "Far more than earlier administrations, the Reagan
White House sought to impose tight discipline on other
agencies." 13 To further Baker's control, the White House
press office instituted daily conference calls with the
press secretaries from other executive agencies that
requested them to conform to the president's agenda. This
type of discipline would have been hard to imagine in the
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Carter White House. The line-of
- the-day was then further
disseminated through Gergen and Speakes during the course of
their day's work.
Independent from Gergen' s control was the
Congressional Relations Office run by chief congressional
lobbyist Max Friedersdorf
. According to Reagan domestic and
economic policy adviser Martin Anderson, Friedersdorf was
highly regarded by Senators and congressmen from both
parties. Kenneth Duberstein, Friedersdorf ' s assistant,
built up bipartisan friendships in the House of
Representatives and also used his knowledge that the loyalty
of Southern Democrats to their party was shaky.
Duberstein' s expertise would contribute to the first term's
legislative success. In fact, the office helped Reagan to
hold 69 face-to-face meetings with members of Congress
during his first 100 days. These congressmen had seen
Reagan more in four months than they had of Carter in four
years . 14
Reagan gave policy-making powers to seven cabinet
councils, which included economic affairs, commerce and
trade, human resources, natural resources, and the
environment, food, and agriculture. Though this helped to
draw Reagan's staff and Cabinet closer together, consensus
was needed prior to going ahead on policy. This meant that
fewer policy initiatives arose from these councils and those
policies that did go forward were watered down, although
they were more broadly supported within the administration.
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Policy was to be handled by real experts, not just
those who, in Baker's opinion, would adversely influence the
president. Baker's management was intolerable to social
conservatives who wanted their agenda advocated by Reagan
more frequently. Instead, Baker encouraged Gergen, who took
over the Office of Communications from Ursamaro after Brady
was wounded in the March 1981 attempt on Reagan's life, to
employ a communications strategy that relied on mostly
moderate policies and compassionate rhetoric. Conservatives
believed Reagan went along with this plan because his
popularity remained high and he was on his way to
accomplishing some of his goals.
Without a conservative influencing policy choices, the
right wing of the Republican party could be held in check.
"Ronald Reagan entered office as the most ideological
president in history," 15 Stephen Hess writes. Richard
Wirthlin, Reagan's pollster, agreed: "[Reagan] was viewed as
much more conservative than the rank and file voter." 16
But Baker, who may have been unfairly criticized for his
"pragmatism, " believed that a more moderate course would
help the president increase his ability to deal with the
Democratically-controlled House of Representatives, the
place where budget proceedings had to begin. Any
legislation passed would also show voters that Reagan was
achieving what he promised.
After failing in his bid to become the chief of staff,
Meese's major responsibility became oversight of the cabinet
committees. Reagan understood the importance of
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neutralizing the cabinet, whose members had proved often to
be too independent-thinking and resistant to changes
proposed by presidents. Yet even knowing this, the Reagan
administration failed to slow the growth of the bureaucracy
Though the Cabinet may provide input on future policy
direction, no president can expect to place complete trust
in those officials. Unusually, however, Reagan asked the
Cabinet members to participate in decision making, albeit
under Meese's direction. Cabinet officers had their most
realistic opportunity to pass along policy suggestions in
these tightly-controlled meetings. Their input, however,
was extremely limited: the information and advice they
sought to impart was filtered first through Meese and was
then passed on to Deaver and Baker. The Cabinet had
virtually no opportunity to communicate openly with the
president . Written memoranda or group discussion were
usually the only ways for the Cabinet to be heard, but
Reagan was not likely to read memoranda thoroughly and
rarely attended council meetings.
Though Meese got to head the cabinet councils, few
conservatives actually believed this position provided him
any tangible effect on policy. In fact, "Much of the New
Right blamed the cumbersome cabinet government system for
the limited attention the administration paid to its
conservative social agenda ." 17 These people hypothesized
that the cabinet government gave the so-called pragmatists
the opportunity to avoid going forward with potentially
controversial, or conservative, policies. Meese's
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conservat ivism was adequately contained by the other members
of the troika in the first four years. It wasn't until the
second term, as Attorney General, that Meese finally became
an influential conservative, pushing for activist Supreme
Court justices who would impact social policy. Meese'
s
activism in the second term was what many conservatives had
hoped to obtain from him earlier. The cabinet council
system eventually failed because Reagan did not directly
communicate with members of the cabinet. As Secretary of
State Alexander Haig later wrote, "Normally, it was the
staff, not the President, who handed out assignments and
received the finished homework ." 18
For Baker and Gergen, retaining high poll numbers
often became the overriding goal, but this caused the first
term to lose the ideological purity on which conservatives
incorrectly believed Reagan was elected. Barber contends
that Reagan attempted to foist extremist policies on
Congress, such as making cuts in programs that served the
poor, slashing environmental laws, and proposing unneeded
military expenses. Baker often protected Reagan by
recognizing that the president's goals could alienate
congressmen or the American people. Reagan agreed with
Baker's recommendations. Therefore, the staff, under
Baker's guidance, pursued only what could be successfully
sold
:
Reagan did espouse strongly held
conservative views, but it would often
be their responsibility not only to
determine how to translate those views
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into policy but to determine as well
which views were to be acted upon
.
19
Reagan's lack of internal communication gave some staff
members the freedom to pursue a wide range of policies that
they believed their leader supported. Though this "reading
of Reagan s mind" was not always correct, it did not stop
speechwriters or even Speakes from doing it. Most
importantly, the lack of communication meant that
conservatives outside the administration would be
disappointed and disillusioned with the direction of policy.
Reagan's appointees, such as those to the Department of
Education, were not set to make reductions in their
departments despite the philosophy of the president.
As Reagan's close public-relations adviser and deputy
chief of staff, Deaver stood between the president and his
communications staff. As a middle man, Deaver helped unify
the first term's communications effort and supported Baker
in charting a more moderate course for the administration.
Major items, such as reducing taxes, implementing supply-
side economics, and expanding the military, would be
pursued, but conservative issues that might divide the
Reagan coalition were not. These issues were predominantly
social in nature, such as Reagan's pro-life stance on
abortion and support for prayer in school, and could break
the fragile bonds between the Reagan voters and his
supporters in Congress.
Besides helping to support Baker's decisions, Deaver
was an excellent public-relations strategist who improved
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Reagan's appearance for television. Deaver was exceptional
at increasing the amount of coverage Reagan would receive
from both the written and televised media. A less media-
savvy president may not have been enthused by Deaver'
s
recommendation that constant publicity be the foremost goal
of the administration. But Reagan was comfortable bringing
in experts at manipulating television and controlling his
presentation through the media. These experts understood
that Reagan was an excellent speaker, a trained actor who
was prepared to advance his policies directly into people's
homes via television. "At least since his Hollywood days,
he has been used to having his appearance managed by
others ." 20 The public appearances of the president were
always scripted. The limited number of press conferences,
at which reporters may ask difficult questions, ensured that
Reagan would not relinquish any potential advantages to the
media by flubbing his response.
Many critics believed that Deaver made a big
difference in handling the president, that without his work
the presidency was doomed to fail. They insisted their
prediction had come true when Deaver' s successors had
trouble keeping Reagan's image untarnished during the second
term. Though he was credited with being a public-relations
genius, Deaver was not given respect by all Reagan
supporters . Most important to the foreshadowing of the
second term's failures was Buchanan's disagreement with the
analysis of his fellow Republicans that Deaver had been
instrumental in Reagan's successes. Buchanan had long
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considered Deaver nothing more than the "Lord of the Chamber
Pot." Deaver, though, assisted the president in more
vital ways than Buchanan was willing to acknowledge. Deaver
was responsible for scheduling the president's speeches and
public appearances. This job was always threatened by
Reagan's astrologer, who was required to authorize the
schedule. In one astonishing example, the presidential
debates against challenger Walter Mondale were scheduled
based solely on the favorable outlook of the zodiac. Still,
making the president's schedule did give Deaver an upper
hand on administration conservatives. As Regan points out,
"the President's schedule is the single most potent tool in
the White House, because it determines what the most
powerful man in the world is going to do and when he is
going to do it ." 22
The modern presidency' s need for external
communications experts likely means that a president will
not have much control over his public-relations apparatus.
Presidential handlers have assumed greater control over
publicity of the White House. And in the Reagan
administration, he would have even less with Baker acting as
a co-president . Under the guidance of Deaver during the
first term, there was a reciprocal control over Reagan.
Reagan' s advisers feared that if left on his own to ad lib,
he would slip up in a press conference or major televised
speech, cite incorrect facts, or speak imprudently while
attempting self-deprecation. "Speeches and other public
appearances were tightly structured, and the effort was made
to keep the President to his script." 23 The media quickly
publicized his major blunders, such as his awkward comment
that trees caused air pollution.
Perhaps most important to Ronald and Nancy Reagan,
Deaver became a good family friend:
Deaver was the best at reading Reagan's
moods, delivering bad news, staging him
in public, or privately coaxing him
into or out of some action the others
thought wise or unwise. 24
Despite all of Deaver' s triumphs in working with the media,
conservatives regularly criticized him for being the member
of the troika who most moderated Reagan's once conservative
policies. As James Watt, Reagan's first Secretary of the
Environment said - unknowingly identifying what would become
the conservative's rallying cry in the second term - Deaver
had not allowed "Reagan to be Reagan."
2 . Communications
Reagan's management style may have made him distant
from policy, and there may have been a dichotomy between the
needs of going public and the hopes of passing conservative
legislation, but neither affected his ability to publicize
his agenda. His use of media tactics did, however, give
communications experts power over policy. As chief of staff
and a savvy veteran of Washington politics, Baker believed
that all communications operations should be integrated for
both short and long-term planning. But this could not be
realized after Brady was wounded. Gergen was moved from his
already powerful position, being named the assistant to the
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president for communications, a role that gave him authority
over Ursamaro. This caused a subtle, though important,
shift in the responsibilities of many members of the White
House staff. Gergen gained substantial power because the
Press Office fell under his direct oversight. Gergen also
oversaw the larger picture on which the administration was
focused and publicized the presidency. For a short time,
Speakes and Gergen were dual administration spokesmen.
While the Press Office must frequently work in
conjunction with the Communications Office, often the two
staffs are pursuing different strategies:
Rather than targeting local media
outlets, the Press Office caters almost
exclusively to the needs of Washington-
based reporters who frequent its domain
on a regular basis . 25
The new staff organization seemed to have a built-in
disadvantage for the media in that neither spokesman knew
all the details of policy creation. Speakes, for example,
was excluded from budget discussions while Gergen was barred
from the deliberations on the MX missile. This gave the
administration a legitimate claim that their spokesmen knew
nothing about certain issues. But this set up also bred
controversy as each feared exclusion and isolation from the
administration
.
The president's agenda was strengthened by having a
responsible press secretary who understood that he had to be
in favor with both the administration and the media. But
the first term also witnessed infighting between Speakes and
Gergen because of their overlapping responsibilities. The
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friction between them did not affect the policy orientation
but did hurt the effort to publicize the line of the day.
Yet Reagan and Baker, understanding the need to downplay
conflict, eventually asked Gergen to remove himself from his
dual role. After retreating from the press briefings, he
began to concentrate on larger policy issues.
Reagan's laid-back style extended into the direct
communications the staff pursued with him. Although he had
an agenda defined by conservative principles, it was only
possible to influence future policy decisions by using
anecdotes or props to impress a point for him. In the
absence of visual aids, it was nearly impossible to persuade
Reagan to change his views. Reagan's faith in people he
liked could not be changed easily. "If Reagan trusted a
staffer, he seldom questioned his recommendations. The
problem was that once he put his faith in someone, he seemed
unable to revise his judgment about him." 26 There was
little chance that merely presenting a better oral argument
would succeed at changing his well-ground beliefs. This
frustrated Stockman, who tried in vain to show Reagan how
deficits would loom under the 1981 budget proposals.
Stockman tried to explain how the needed "cuts" in the
Defense Department would really just be slowing the rate of
increase
.
Reagan' s management style affected the first term much
as it did the second, but Baker tried to prevent it from
hampering the president's agenda. Speakes, writing about
his experience at the White House in Speaking Out , admitted
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that he fabricated Reagan quotes in order to speed up his
work, an admission that cost him his post
- administrat ion
job. Speakes could brief the press without consulting
Reagan on the issue because "he assumed he knew what the
President wanted to say ." 27 Deaver's credibility was
similarly damaged when he admitted to assisting Speakes in
making up these quotes. If these kinds of actions were
taking place at the top of the organizational chart, then it
is evident how lower-level staff members thought they had a
large leeway in their own actions.
The types of policy pursued, however, were carefully
controlled by Deaver and Baker with the assistance of
Wirthlin, an indispensable proponent of specific policies.
Reagan's unusual skills, learned from his years as an actor,
may have made it possible for him to sell policies that
polling data suggested were not widely popular. Despite
Wirthlin' s expertise in determining when a policy was not
supported by Americans, the president could often
successfully sell the policy, convincing Congress to vote
with him:
[H] e did understand, without needing to
consult Wirthlin' s polls or his cue
cards, that he possessed a special
'something' that transcended the appeal
of ordinary politicians . 28
But Reagan did not use this route often enough to appease
some conservatives.
Reagan did not want an adversarial relationship with
the press, though he did place restrictions on the access of
the media. But,
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Unlike both Ford and Carter, Reagan did
not come into office with a promise for
an open administration. Furthermore,
he set clear lines of authority in the
White House, and he and his staff
wielded considerable control over the
flow of news from all parts of the
executive branch. 29
In dealing with the press and Congress, Reagan was careful
to avoid the problems Nixon encountered using a "hardball"
strategy. While "hardball" would have been out of Reagan's
character anyway, it also was perceived as helping to
strengthen Congress' resolve and permit the media to more
deeply examine his policies. If Reagan wished to shun the
media, he would pretend to not hear reporters' questions as
he walked across the White House lawn to his waiting
helicopter. If policy were not to be disclosed at press
conferences, then his spokesmen would truly be uninformed.
3 . Speechwri t ino
The external communications could not have taken place
without the speechwriters . Reagan promoted policies by
persuading the public with well-crafted rhetoric. These
popular appeals "over the head" of the Democrat -controlled
House of Representatives were a key component of Reagan's
early successes and gave him the needed leadership
credentials. Careful planning by Reagan's strategists
allowed a moderate agenda to gain acceptance in a sharply
divided Congress, where Republicans held the Senate for his
first six years.
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Reagan's speeches, Barber claims, further separated
rhetoric from actual policy, though Buchanan moved the two
closer together in the second term. But polls always tended
to show that the public understood, and could differentiate,
between Reagan the person and Reagan the policymaker. His
popularity was not an aberration until his policy failures
and misguided political strategies accumulated during the
second term. Reagan's public speeches were seen as non-
president ial in character by some experts in communication:
"His manner of communication fits the requirements of
television as a medium - not necessarily those of governing
or ruling a nation ." 30 With the success he achieved,
however, this criticism was irrelevant.
Though the president's rhetoric was important, the
communications staff realized that merely getting the
president on television was often enough to maintain his
popularity. And the American people, especially his
supporters, wanted to see the president in the best light
possible. "The lesson is clear. Maintaining popular
support means carefully controlling what is seen rather than
what is said ." 31 Thus Reagan's flubbing of lines was not
nearly as important to the American people as the overall
message he was putting out.
External communications were Reagan's forte in his
normally scripted environment. The staff carefully watched
for off-the-cuff remarks by the president and took
precautions to avoid them. When they occurred, "Deaver,
Speakes, and the others would shake their heads in
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affectionate bafflement and scurry to contain what they
regarded as 'the damage .'" 32 The staff shielded the
president from controversy to retain his high poll numbers.
The manipulation of television news was successfully put
into practice by Reagan's staff, in that the evening news
broadcasts were filled with flattering images of the
president. It did not matter if the dialogue accompanying
the images was critical of the president or his policies.
CBS's Leslie Stahl learned this the hard way when she was
thanked by Reagan officials for a detailed piece that
criticized the president for failing to speak to the press
on its terms
.
The general philosophical course of Reagan's first
term was prominently on display in the domain of the
speechwriting shop. For these writers, Reagan literally
only "provided general direction; specific policy came
exclusively from the bottom up ." 33 The ideological content
of Reagan's speeches normally had the dual purpose of
promoting the agenda and changing peoples' opinions. In
fact
,
a substantial number of those speeches
contain an ordered argument and
relatively few, compared to the most
recent presidents, are mere laundry
lists of points . 34
Reagan' s speechwri ters understood their role was to present
the president's ideas clearly and concisely to the American
public
.
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Speechwri ters are responsible for translating the
political policies of their superiors into persuasive and
understandable prose:
The demands of the rhetorical
presidency have heightened the
importance of speechwri ters and
expanded their number in recent
administrations
.
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The speechwri ters made Reagan's already telegenic
personality come across better with the American public and
showed his desire to please the American people, a
characteristic of Barber's passive -posit ive president. The
speechwri ters ensured that Reagan used facts to bolster the
policies he advocated. The first-term speechwri ters also
made sure that Reagan did not use harsh language in his
attempts to persuade: many voters already had the
perception, developed by Carter, that Reagan was "trigger-
happy." To calm these fears, the speechwri ters had to
soften his tone.
Even former Nixon speechwriter William Safire admits
that the writers must get involved with the policies of the
president, despite the usual reservations from the chief of
staff. "A speechwriter, one might think, is no policy
setter, only an articulation aide whose highest duty is to
reflect the desires of the President and his expert
adviser ." 36 But the predilections and biases of a writer
should be well known to the president and his chief of
staff, Safire says, allowing them to control the direction
of the administration fully.
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The first-term speechwriters
,
under the supervision of
Bentley Elliott, were not often left on their own to create
policy. The control over the speechwriters was normally
exercised by returning memos to them with suggestions for
proper writing style and eliminating biases:
In the first administration Dick Darman
received, along with the speechwri ter
,
a copy of each suggestion, and it was
Dick who had the final say on which
suggestions must be included and which
could be ignored. 37
Then the speech went to the president for his input.
Buchanan hoped to correct this problem in the second term by
giving more freedom to the individual writer.
State Department officials interfered with Noonan's
first major speech that she wrote for Reagan during his 1984
trip to China. They wanted to correct her draft line by
line, a constant frustration for a woman who deeply admired
Reagan
:
What I learned was that I would have to
watch out at the White House. . . for the
kind of editors who want to sit around
and give you their opinions on things
instead of concentrating on the text
and catching your factual mistakes. 38
Factual errors that were not caught could lead Reagan to
bolster his preconceived beliefs. Proofreading and thorough
research are essential to ensure no errors, inconsistencies,
or change in policy direction occur. Yet errors and
arguments crept in more frequently during the later Reagan
years, even though he had his "speeches carefully crafted by
the largest and most professional groups of writers and
researchers ever assembled in the White House."
31
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Critics of using public communication to influence
policy see the rhetoric as temporary political maneuvering
that hurts the entire political process: "At times, going
public will be merely superfluous - fluff compared with the
substance of traditional political exchange ." 40 Reagan
altered this perception, however, by having his speeches
prepared with substantially more content and point
-by-point
policy arguments than earlier presidents. Reagan's speeches
were used to persuade people rationally, more than
emotionally, that the policies he advocated would set the
course for a better and stronger America.
C. Expectations
Like other observers of modern American politics,
Barber believes the increasing length of the presidential
campaign and the need to win primaries forces new challenges
upon the modern president. The biggest of these challenges
is following through on the voters' expectations:
Our generation's contribution to
politics, the endless campaign, still
manages to throw down an iron curtain
between the suppositions of running for
President and the actualities of being
one . 41
Reagan used the bully pulpit to influence the electorate.
He was able to tap into the American public's short
attention span and charm people with his wit, Barber claims.
Reagan's often careless attitude led him to believe facts
that had no basis in reality and had no relevance to his
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policies. Barber's cynical view expresses little faith in
the intelligence of choices made by the American people.
Barber seeks to explain how President Reagan attained
his great popularity. Barber points to the "manipulative
rhetoric" 4 *- used by Reagan in the 1980 election as the
major factor in obtaining electoral support. While male
voters were not bothered by this, women tended to see Reagan
as cold and calculating. There was certainly a gender gap
occurring, and James Baker, realizing this, tried to soften
Reagan's image.
Robert Denton, a communications expert, provides an
especially gloomy portrait of how the modern presidential
campaigns harm the president's ability to succeed once in
the White House. Popularity becomes the sole importance of
the presidency, Denton claims, even though the president
should be working with other branches of government to
accomplish goals. "Policy making is a collective affair
rather than a competitive endeavor." 43 In other words,
politics is the art of compromise.
Yet the potential exists for the president's
promotional techniques to cause the public's hopes and
expectations to rise too high: "The presidential press-
agentry has not only expanded public expectations of the
presidency but also distorted the self -perceptions of
persons within the presidential establishment." Reagan s
major campaign issues, emphasizing supply-side economics and
protecting the United States from Soviet threat, required
him to set his agenda in motion quickly. Reagan's advisers,
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however, saw a need to protect his popularity by going over
others' heads when necessary, making other political bodies
less likely and able to act on their own volition.
D. Results
The failed attempt on Reagan's life created unique
circumstances for the less than three -month-old presidency.
Prior to the attempted assassination, Reagan's agenda was
stalled in Congress. His speedy recovery from near death
won him praise and renewed support from the public and
Congress. Barber suggests that this may have given Reagan
the ability to succeed in passing a wider presidential
program than otherwise would have been possible for a
Republican president in the institutional setting.
While conservatives believe that the Washington media
and the Eastern Establishment press, such as the nightly
network news broadcasts and The New York Times or The
Washington Post
,
are tougher on Republican politicians than
Democrats, there is little evidence to validate this belief.
Reagan's first year, in fact, was characterized by the
extended honeymoon with the media. Even before the
assassination attempt, Reagan was given a full chance to
succeed, having been elected to lower the inflation Carter
left behind. "The economy was certainly the dominant issue
of the campaign," wrote William Schneider . 45 Thus the
media did not immediately discredit his economic program as
"voodoo economics," the term candidate George Bush applied
to Reagan's vision.
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Adapting the president's campaign promises to
political reality is the responsibility of his staff, which,
during Reagan's first months in office, was prepared to push
for large policy changes using an orderly process. The LSG,
led by Baker, met every afternoon between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m
to work on shaping Reagan's ideas and designing policy.
Although the focus of the group was completely on the
implementation, not the development, of policy, its
recommendations could have a significant effect on that
policy.
"
4b And Wirthlin had already formulated a method
for Reagan's legislative success. Called the Wirthlin Plan,
Meese explains that it
envisioned, first and foremost, a
strong initiative on tax and budget
issues.
. . The idea was to exploit the
force of public opinion - to remind the
legislators of who had elected them -
and thereby counter the special
interest pressures we knew would be
mounted in opposition to the Reagan
program
.
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Duberstein was instrumental in selling the Reagan budget on
Capitol Hill, arranging a White House visit from House
Budget Committee Chairman Jim Jones, D-Oklahoma, who was
pushing for reconciliation on the tax bill. Duberstein said
that "For most issues you have to lobby all 435 congressmen
and almost all 100 Senators." 48
Reagan's public-relations efforts and external
communications with both citizens and members of Congress
could hardly have performed better than they did in his
first year. Reagan's communications staff worked with
Stockman to prepare the president's economic agenda for sale
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to Congress. The first year's emphasis on the budget and
building a relationship with Congress by using
administration numbers gave Stockman a prominent role.
Stockman tried to use his position to coerce cabinet
secretaries to follow through on the proposed budget and
future tax cuts, but it was Reagan's stubbornness that
prevented Stockman from securing all his wishes.
Stockman provided details to the LSG about his daily
meetings with congressmen during the 1981 budget battle.
But Stockman was powerless to persuade members of the group
when he felt a new economic direction, moving away from both
the entitlement and tax cuts, was necessary.
Crucial to these early successes was procuring public
pressure for lower taxes and a smaller government using the
Wirthlin Plan. Communications officials did a tremendous
job of "enlightening" Congress as to what Americans demanded
of their government. This pressure would permit Reagan not
only to obtain the desired budget cuts but also the Kemp-
Roth tax cut. Throughout the first year of Reagan's
presidency, "The White House communications unit helped
convince Congress that public opinion was behind the
administration's iniatives .
"
49 Polls already indicated
that, after Carter's presidency, Americans had less faith in
their government, which ironically Reagan later helped to
revitalize. Though public opinion may not have been behind
all his policies, communications specialists were able to
persuade Congress that Reagan's economic agenda was
supported. But the president had to take care that he did
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In 1981,
not go too far or his support would be weakened,
for example, Medicare had at least 85 percent support; 50
school lunches 53 percent. 51
Reagan's supporters believed that he needed to slash
specific budgets to make the government work better and for
his supply-side economic program to succeed. But Reagan was
"so enthusiastically in favour of delegation that policy
execution often remained seriously unattended." 52 Reagan
distanced himself from unpopular spending cuts. Cabinet
secretaries became an unlikely ally in providing him with a
shield that many presidents have not had. Paul Light claims
that Reagan was really just trying to improve his political
standing in Washington for the short term:
Indeed, my data suggest that Reagan's
year of greatest legislative
achievement, 1981, was built almost
entirely on short-term policy proposals
designed to pay out quickly, whether
politically or economically. 53
These proposals included Reagan's insistence to have both
the popular tax cuts (for more than the one year proposed by
Democrats) and an increase in military spending.
Reagan and his advisers had to make an important
decision that hinged on whether to go public on the Gramm-
Latta budget reconciliation bill or wait to employ the
public strategy on the Kemp-Roth tax cut. Both items were
at the heart of the Reagan economic agenda, which, at its
most basic, was about reducing taxes and domestic spending.
But both were not likely to be approved by Congress with
Reagan's limited political capital. Reagan opted to wait
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until Congressional debate on the Kemp-Roth tax cut before
using public persuasion. Constituents would place pressure
on their representatives to change their votes. The
eventual fervor for a tax cut, which many people believed
would lead to higher disposable incomes, was created by
Reagan s appeals and the simplicity of the message.
Bargaining served Reagan well during the first term,
especially in surviving many of the close votes on the 1981
budget, but he did not stand by this strategy for long.
Reagan authorized Stockman to use a personal manner to sell
the budget and tax cuts on Capitol Hill. In doing so,
Stockman obtained a coalition of the liberal Northern
Republicans and the conservative "Boll Weevil" Southern
Democrats. The problem with this coalition was that it
could not easily be replicated on social and foreign policy
issues. Stockman's revised projections showed an $82
billion deficit in 1982 and a $116 billion deficit in 1984.
The budget battle of 1981 is testimony to the concerns
Reagan had with using the bargaining strategy, even though
he did receive short-term benefits from it. As long as
Reagan retained a high level of support, he could go over
the heads of Congress and even persuade Democrats under the
influence of popular Speaker Tip O'Neill. "His capacity to
succeed... depends much on congressional relations; and his
public communication is a factor in both these and in the
wider endorsement of his expenditure goals."" 4 The budget
deals proved that Reagan had voters on his side. Polling
completed jointly by CBS News and The New York Times between
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Sept. 21-27, 1981 showed that 64 percent trusted Reagan to
make the right decisions on the entire federal budget, and
69 percent believed he would be equally successful on
defense spending. But he hit a low point on Social
Security, where only 48 percent trusted him55 after he made
threats to overhaul that system. Reagan backed off on these
threats at the Republican convention, promising to leave
Social Security off the table. The staff carefully chose
the areas to cut, rolling back expenditures in some
departments by imposing user fees or other similar payment
schemes
.
The president's poll-driven strategy required that
voters remain supportive of Reagan's policies, not just
Reagan the happy-go-lucky politician. "Regardless of the
skill of this administration, however, the cuts could not
have been enacted if the majority of voters had been
unsympathetic to the policy." 56 Reagan, his high-level
staff, and his communications officials worked together to
maintain the base of popularity that he obtained from their
1981 successes. The president needed this popularity to
survive the following year's recession. Deaver skillfully
used Reagan' s initial popularity from the budget battles to
legitimate further public appeals. Still, in the midst of a
recession, there was little chance that Reagan would have as
much influence over the budget proceedings. His political
capital and standing with the voters had declined, and his
further demands for cuts to social programs went too far,
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even for members of Congress who had earlier supported his
goals
.
Not surprisingly, Reagan's popularity declined as the
economy slowed in 1982, making it improbable that he could
persist with his economic plan. Reagan's approval ratings
plummeted during the recession. On January 19, 1983, only
between 37 (Gallup) and 39 percent (Harris) of respondents
still gave Reagan their approval. 57 He hit a lower mark
between Jan. 28 and 31 when only 35 percent approved of his
job performance in a Gallup poll. 58 But the president's
renewed popularity, after overcoming the 1982 recession,
could permit a wider range of policies to be enacted even in
the absence of traditional bargaining. This potential
advantage, however, was mostly offset by the large deficit
figures which stalled Reagan's further tax reduction plans.
Americans remained surprisingly confident in the
president's policies. Just as his initial measures were
designed to halt inflation, the public expected Reagan to
get out of the recession. His poll numbers looked better
when people were asked whether what he had so far
accomplished would be good for the country in the long run.
More than half those questioned, 53 percent, agreed with his
goals. Only 35 percent said Reagan's actions would not help
end the recession. 59
The general strength of Reagan's presidency was based
on the perceptions that he was both tough and moral. An ABC
News/The Washington Post poll taken between Feb. 25 and
March 2, 1983 showed that overwhelming numbers believed
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Reagan was a strong leader (60-37 percent) and an honest
person (70-20 percent)
. These numbers were posted in spite
of the fact that the same respondents also believed, by a
42-53 percentage count, that he was not keeping his original
campaign promises. 60 The divergence is best explained by
the recession, but the Baker-led strategy to moderate the
agenda might have contributed to this feeling. Still, a
weaker president than Reagan would likely have seen his poll
numbers fall more dramatically. In contrast to the view
espoused by Barber that Reagan's policies were mean
spirited, Reagan's first-term successes may have actually
come at a cost to his own credibility as the leader of a
conservative realignment. Reagan allowed Baker to moderate
his agenda by not pursuing conservative social values in
legislative policy.
Besides his domestic success, Reagan understood that
setting foreign policy goals early in his administration
would improve his standing nationally and internationally.
Crises abroad tend to improve a president's ratings for the
short term. For example, Carter's approval ratings actually
went up when Americans at the embassy in Tehran were taken
hostage in 1979. It was the prolonged internment that
became a crisis for the Carter presidency. For Ronald
Reagan, the 1983 invasion of Grenada was a public relations
coup. Even the terrorist attack on marines stationed in
Lebanon gave Reagan's approval ratings a boost.
The heavy use of public opinion polls to run the
government during the 1981-1985 time frame affected the type
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of leadership Americans received. Rather than being the
decisive president who would identify an issue based on
ideology alone, Reagan and his staff instead responded to
concerns from the public that were identified in polling
data. Reagan was criticized as one who led by the
popularity of the issue. Every time he used a public
opinion poll, conservatives believed, Reagan was pandering
to the moderates in the administration and inhibiting the
conservative revolution.
The expanded use of public appeals, professor of
political science and author Samuel Kernell says, makes
future compromise between a president and Congress more
difficult. "By imposing costs and failing to offer
benefits, going public is more akin to force than to
bargaining ." 61 Reagan and Congressional leaders proved
this, as less popular policy, even when it would benefit
many people, was virtually impossible to pass. One senator
even promised to vote against anything the president
proposed because of the administration's tactics. Reagan's
publ ic - speaking role, however, is not the only explanation
for his tremendous successes in the first term. In these
early years, the communications staff knew the objectives
that were being sought. No one was entirely clear as to the
goals Reagan wanted pursued in the second term, including
the chief of staff.
Polls can help alleviate the concerns that going
public sometimes raises. By studying and interpreting
public opinion polls, the president and his staff could
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almost instantly evaluate the success of their external
communications and understand what could be delivered to the
American people. A president, though, will want to go
beyond this, understanding to ask whether he really wants
polls to control his policies. Unlike Nixon's claims to a
silent majority" that supported his issues, Wirthlin tried
to identify people's real opinions and the potential that
existed to change these beliefs. In addition to the polls,
Wirthlin had another resource that had not been fully
exploited: examining the papers outside Washington, D.C. to
discover the issues they were writing about and
editorializing on. The daily news summary, first supplied
to President Nixon, kept Reagan abreast of developments
within the media nationwide.
Republican senators in 1983 feared that Reagan was
shying away from more budget cuts because of low poll
numbers. Reagan did not want to risk lowering his
popularity at this time for the sake of policy:
Strategic presidents balance their
ongoing need for popular support
against their desire to achieve policy
goals important to them and their
party's core constituencies, and
therefore they do not always
automatically act to increase their
popularity
.
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Reagan's accomplishments did not come at the expense of his
popularity, but his policies did become less well liked. In
1984, 70 percent of those polled gave Reagan a negative
rating on his handling of the federal budget and deficit. , ' ,
In an NBC News poll taken from Feb. 3-4, 1985, 77 percent of
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the respondents blamed Reagan for the size of the federal
deficit. 64 This did not matter to Reagan's advisers
because it was not a major issue for the electorate. But
the $200 billion annual deficits, according to Light, meant
that Reagan was not free to add issues to his agenda in the
second term. This eventually reduced his staff's
flexibility
.
Wirthlin's skills allowed high-level Reagan staffers
to understand how pressuring representatives in their own
home districts could be effective and how far the president
could move to the right. While his staff was studying the
polls, however, Reagan was content not to:
Reagan was rarely a poll-driven
president. He took many positions,
most notably in supporting the Contras
and in opposing abortion, where
Wirthlin' s polls found him out of step
with American public opinion. 65
Reagan could take these views because he could speak so
well . Neustadt argues that the talent to inspire the public
through speech varies among presidents: "Expertise in
presidential power seems to be the province not of
politicians as a class but of extraordinary politicians." 66
When a new president takes office, he is seen as competent
for having withstood the assaults that come from the
campaign trail. But this is not always enough to consider
his rhetoric great.
Despite Gergen's excellent work, he was increasingly
frustrated with Reagan's performance. Gergen and Baker had
both encouraged Reagan to protect some middle ground so he
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could win re election in 1984. Gergen admitted his dislike
for what Reagan was doing to the press conference format.
He wanted Reagan to be more friendly to the media and more
willing to discuss important issues with them. " [P] ress
conferences have become increasingly unproductive. They're
not as spontaneous or as intimate as they should be." 67
Yet the lack of press conferences did not appear to bother
Reagan during the first term:
Particular care was taken with the
staging of press conferences, each of
which was preceded by two days of
rehearsals in which answers were
supplied to all the questions that the
White House staff could anticipate. 68
And conservatives did not respect the work Gergen had done.
Complaints came from within the administration that "Gergen
was too cozy in his relationship with reporters, and they
accused him of being a major source of White House
leaks." 69 But Regan and Haig both admit that many White
House aides were given the directive to leak the
administration's inside information. 70 Many of these leaks
were directed at friendly congressmen who the administration
felt could be trusted to vote in support of the Reagan
agenda
.
Gergen finally resigned from his post as
communications director when he felt too much attention was
given to the visual aspects at the expense of the written
press. Reagan, he said, had entered a deceitful
relationship with the Washington-based reporters. And
Reagan administration officials viewed those that
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represented newspapers as a less effective means to get the
message out. Gergen was also upset about Reagan's attempts
to set the agenda for the television networks. Most
importantly, though, the communications director began to
feel isolated in his battle against the more conservative
elements in the incoming administration, since he no longer
would have the prominent support of James Baker. Gergen
would become critical of the direction of Reagan's second
term in frequent essays for U.S. News & World Report ,
evidence that there was a major change in the style and
substance of that position.
Reagan's victory in 1980 was supposed to be a signal
to conservatives that they would have a man of like mind in
the White House. Though it was not stressed in the 1980
campaign, people understood that Reagan believed in moral
values and a return to the Judeo-Christian roots of American
society. But those who expected Reagan to advance both a
social and economic agenda in the first term would be
disappointed. He simply did not have the political capital
to move on the social issues.
The first-term staff was also unexpectedly moderate,
at least compared to the Republicans who arrived with Reagan
from California. Baker did not share every conservative
belief; Gergen understood the difficulty of promoting a
conservative agenda and passing it through Congress; Deaver
wanted to keep the president's popularity high by softening
his image. Only Meese, who was ultimately stymied in his
efforts, could qualify as a conservative conscience for the
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first term. And though Reagan had a Republican majority in
the Senate, some of the senators had campaigned to the left
of Reagan and could not be counted on to vote for his
agenda
.
Should he choose to do so, the president is the only
politician who can wage all his political wars through the
media. 'A president can, nearly at any time, command the
attention of the media and speak directly to the American
people . " The usefulness of this form of communication
declined in the second term. Institutional factors may have
caused a drop in the effectiveness of popular appeals, but
many blame the repetitiveness of the second term's agenda.
The second-term staff was less inclined to study
polls, arguing that the personal popularity of the president
alone could be translated into legislative triumphs. The
conservatives, many of whom took over key positions in the
White House following the 1984 campaign, hoped to initiate
and then pass domestic policy using Reagan' s high approval
ratings as their only leverage. This strategy for passing
legislation hinged on the president retaining high poll
numbers to counter the Democrat-controlled Congress, which
would be generally hostile to the administration's
proposals
.
James Baker became a more important figure, both
politically and ideologically, than many political writers,
like Barber, initially expected. Barber's analysis of the
Reagan presidency, written shortly after the first term
ended, is valuable for this thesis because he identifies the
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weaknesses inherent in the president's agenda and
strategies. As a commentator, Barber sees "meanness" at the
center of many of Reagan's policies. Barber is puzzled as
to how Reagan could first become, and then later remain, so
popular. Barber views negatively, for instance, the 1981
budget, which slashed social programs and cut entitlements
while expanding the military budget:
A visitor from some alien planet,
discovering this pattern of cruelty and
repression, might well posit a monster
at the center of it, an evil Professor
Moriarty or Darth Vader controlling the
attack on the defenseless. 72
This jaded portrait of the American people's perception of
Reagan as a "kindly old grandpa" was precisely the dangerous
type of president Barber had predicted Reagan would be in an
article in the Jan. 20, 1981 The Washington Post .
Many of those who disagreed with Reagan's policy
positions, though, could comprehend why he became a warm
figure for many: he projected wit, humor, and truthfulness.
Reagan's Hollywood acting skills probably helped sell, or at
minimum gloss over, unpopular policy. Yet in spite of
constant reminders about his personal visions and beliefs,
the American people eventually discovered a way to separate
their adoration for "Reagan the man" from their reservations
about "Reagan the ideological conservative." Many Americans
still liked Reagan but were becoming less pleased with his
accomplishments. Still, people were basically content with
the economy, the major issue on which votes would turn:
In late 1984, Louis Harris found the
public gave Reagan positive marks for
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his handling of only two issues:
inflation and the overall economy. 73
So, as Wirthlin explains, the 1984 election was not
determined by the candidates' personalities or negative
voting by the public, but rather by the voters' happiness
with the economy.
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CHAPTER V
SECOND TERM
A. Results of the 1984 Campaign
The people responsible for the Reagan re-election
effort decided to run an almost issue-free campaign in 1984,
re-working the themes their candidate had successfully used
to defeat Carter. Reagan was pleased to let his first-term
record and political resume speak for themselves. He cited
his accomplishments by asking voters if they were better off
than they were in 1980. However, he also explained to
voters that he needed a second term in order to pass
leftover policies, continue the rapid economic recovery, and
maintain an aggressive foreign policy. This type of
campaign provided fodder for Reagan's critics, who saw the
president's popularity increasing despite the failure to
introduce new policy or recognize the deficiencies in his
agenda
:
Clearly the 1984 presidential election
demonstrated that political issues and
ideology matter little in selecting a
president. The polls continually
showed that voters favored Ronald
Reagan based on elements of persona and
charisma but disagreed with his issue
positions
.
1
The voters, though, apparently not having lost faith in
Reagan's leadership skills or positive thinking, handed him
an easy win over former Vice President Walter Mondale. The
1984 election confirmed support for some of Reagan's views.
"Most Americans not only like Reagan but agreed with what he
was saying, at least on the issues most important to
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them
.
" 2 Yet Reagan's effectiveness as a party leader and
outstanding orator, both still in evidence during the
campaign, would deteriorate in the following years.
While Reagan's landslide victory in 1984 seemed to
provide him with a mandate, this margin was not necessarily
based on winning the opinions of Americans, even though the
ideological differences between Reagan and Mondale were
well-defined during the campaign. The American people
understood that they would have to choose which politician's
beliefs
,
world views, and personal values would
prevail. But because the second term would focus so much on
the value debate, the extent of Reagan's mandate in this
area, at least to members of Congress, was going to
determine the success of the agenda.
Chief of Staff Donald Regan did not want the second
administration to devote itself solely to appearances. That
emphasis, he believed, had stalled policy in the first term.
Regan writes that the "preoccupation with outward style
[came] at the expense of inner conviction." 3 However,
Regan did not realize that the economic policy and security-
related issues, both important to the conservative agenda,
received a far less visible mandate from voters in 1984 than
in 1980. Though Reagan's electoral achievement made it seem
unlikely to occur, the going-public tactics that worked so
well in advancing his policies from 1981 to 1985 were not
nearly as successful afterward. There was a significant
drop off in his political capital, a crucial element for a
president who depended on passing legislation rather than
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using executive orders or other administrative devices.
Reagan and his staff continued the same communications
strategy that had won him earlier victories.
While creating policy would be a challenge because
there were no passionate issues cultivated during the
campaign, the real problem for administration conservatives
was the newly discovered difficulty in selling Reagan
policies to the American public. Even if it is conceded
that Reagan won the value debate, this would mean little if
his chief of staff could not prepare a suitable agenda for
the second term.
B. Re-staffing the White House
1. Chief of Staff
The supposedly renewed emphasis on a conservative
agenda had its origin just twelve days before Reagan's
second inauguration, when the president agreed that Chief of
Staff James Baker and Treasury Secretary Donald Regan could
swap jobs. Regan and Baker had already agreed to the
exchange in the fall but needed the formal approval of the
president. Reagan gave little thought as to how Regan's
appointment as chief of staff might affect the direction of
policy or the quality of its development. According to
newspaper writer Hedrick Smith, the change threw "into
turmoil efforts to formulate Reagan's agenda." 4 Already
there had been no massive planning effort conducted by the
LSG prior to the second term. The eventual stagnation in
policy creation became a convenient excuse for the second-
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term failures. The lack of new policy ideas during the
campaign meant that creation of policy would be the
responsibility of Regan and his incoming staff.
The new staff Reagan appointed had less experience
than the first-term team and did not prepare as well for
their task of advancing policy. As Stephen Hess put it,
Reagan was "receiving advice from a smaller, shallower, and
politically less savvy pool at the White House ." 5 Lobbying
on Capitol Hill would also not be as effective with
Friedersdorf and Duberstein gone from the West Wing. While
it is convenient to blame Regan's inexperience for the
failures of the second term, President Reagan must assume
responsibility for his ignorance that such a major overhaul
in the leadership of his staff posed risks to his
effectiveness. For instance, there was a shift toward
giving the president more to do:
[T] he replacement of Baker by Regan
would lead to deactivation of the
protective system that had repeatedly
put the White House staff on damage-
control alert whenever the president
had blundered in the first term . 6
Much like Baker, Regan would try to become Reagan's co-
president, advising him on the course to pursue. Some even
referred to Regan as "prime minister." But unlike Baker,
Regan did not want to use Wirthlin's polls to moderate the
president's agenda and did not have the same level of
expertise in formulating policy.
Though Wirthlin had provided vital information that
measured support for Reagan's policies, he was not expected
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to have a similar influence over Regan. The moderate
agenda, Regan believed, may have been followed because of
the poll numbers:
In my opinion this failure of political
will stemmed in significant measure
from a superficial belief on the part
of some of Reagan's people that his
agenda was unfashionable
. . . Reagan was
continuously being pressured to
compromise in ways that preserved the
influence and the policies of the
defeated opposition
.
7
For instance, the LSG prepared two economic agendas, one
that was ideal for Reagan's beliefs and the other that could
pass through the House. Regan saw this as using polls to
deny a conservative program from being implemented. But
Martin Anderson says this was not the case: "It was Reagan,
and Reagan alone, who decided that four-fifths of a loaf,
especially a loaf that was perhaps too large to begin with,
was better than no loaf ." 8 Nevertheless, Regan forged
ahead with his ideas on restoring some of Reagan's original
goals
.
Regan rapidly made a number of changes to the Baker-
led staff that had performed so well for the president
throughout the first term:
The swift moves he had made to overhaul
the command structure and consolidate
his own power base were largely
directed at the staffs he inherited
from Baker and Meese; and he replaced
numerous deputies with people he knew
would be loyal to him . 9
Many critics fault the second-term staff for not having
enough political skill or good judgment to overcome the
president's hands-off style. Reagan "did not have the
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political sensitivity and eye for political danger of any of
the three men he replaced ." 10 Unwilling to be influenced
by others, Regan made that claim that the president was his
only master. But this did not hide his own inexperience.
Regan later admitted that he was surprised the press
had such a large role in what Reagan could accomplish. "I
was shocked by the extent to which the press determined the
everyday activities, and even the philosophical tenor, of
the Presidency. 1,11 The new chief of staff did not seem
prepared to handle the day-to-day activities running the
White House required. Rather than having face-to-face
meetings with his staff, as Baker had, Regan preferred
written memos that outlined policy.
Regan instituted a presidential decision-making
process that resembled Baker's only on the surface. He
believed the president needed to play a larger role in
shaping policy. "Policy will be set by discussions among a
lot of us, finally the President deciding on the policy and
then going from there ." 12 Few options were actually
presented to the president, however, and Regan drew fire
from some in the administration for not giving the president
enough to do. It was also clear that Regan was less capable
than Baker at judging the merits of policy.
Gaining control of and power over other staff members
was important to Regan. At one time, under his directive,
communication by the senior staff was nearly closed down:
So that the flow of news would come
only from the proper quarter - the
White House Press Office - at one point
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I laid down the rule that no member ofthe senior staff could talk to the
press unless a member of the White
House Press Office staff was present. 13
This action caused the corresponding flow of information to
the media to be severely restricted. Policy promotion, as
Gergen proved, depends on more than just the president's
public speaking.
The loss of Baker and Darman to Treasury, coupled with
the later departures of Gergen and Deaver, closed out the
moderating influences on Reagan and sealed a more
conservative direction. But the exact nature of this
conservatism had yet to be determined. As chief of staff,
Regan would have the opportunity to dictate the kinds of
changes he wanted to take place. But the appointment of
Buchanan left the type of conservatism in doubt.
2 . Communications
Regan needed a communications director who would not
bring controversy. However, Regan believed that Reagan's
public appeal in the first term had been built mostly on
appearances while Gergen' s success depended on Baker's
moderate agenda. The choice of Buchanan to fill the vacant
communications position was, Regan admits in his
autobiography, designed to protect his own right flank:
Regan brought a hard-charging,
combative approach to White House
policy, particularly in choosing a
confrontational right-wing newspaper
columnist, Patrick Buchanan, as
communications director. 14
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Moving to the right did not suit the president well, causing
image problems to arise that he had seemingly conguered in
the first term. Regan believed he was acting correctly by
protecting his conservative flank, but it eventually proved
to be more than he could handle when he could not control
Buchanan
.
Conservatives were still restless for their policy
ideas to gain acceptance in the White House. Baker had
effectively used Deaver as a shield against Meese
. Unlike
Baker, though, Regan did not have a Deaver clone to assist
him in preventing an overly conservative agenda from coming
to fruition or simply in protecting the course he
envisioned. Rather than finding a director who would only
carry out the responsibilities of a long-term public-
relations campaign, Regan chose a man who would also
endeavor to have an immediate impact on policy questions and
intended to put in place a promotional program for
conservative principles.
Buchanan, once the most ideological of Nixon's skilled
speechwriters
,
wanted his staff to have more influence over
the direction of policy. Buchanan's emphasis on policy
creation, rather than just policy promotion, disturbed many
observers, including Gergen, who had worked hard to make
Reagan effective at advancing policy through Congress.
Buchanan's previous experience gave him sound reasons to
believe that he could assist in setting policy. During the
Nixon years, fellow speechwriter William Safire and Buchanan
met weekly with Herbert Klein and other staff members to
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manage political issues and projects that did not require
daily deadlines. Buchanan's hard-hitting speeches became
legendary, such as the one he scripted for Vice President
Spiro Agnew's 1970 Des Moines speech that took aim against
Eastern Establishment media elites. Buchanan had also been
used to draft policy positions that required tough talk from
the president and did not need to appeal to what Nixon saw
as a vocal minority:
Nixon never wanted us to work in
committee, not only because of his
abhorrence of watered-down committee
writing, but he wanted to cast his
speeches according to the 'tilt,' as he
put it, of his writers. 15
Regan knew about Buchanan's use of divisive rhetoric and the
complications that could arise by choosing him as the
communications director.
Buchanan believed that the nation had twice taken a
conservative turn by electing and then re-electing Reagan.
This view was loosely supported by the possibility of a
conservative realignment of the voting public, based on both
social and economic issues, that resulted from the 1980
election. Republicans gained 33 seats in the House of
Representatives and took 12 Senate seats, though only the
latter victory gave Reagan a majority with which to work.
The House remained out of reach. Nevertheless, Buchanan
believed the victories should give the president the
ambition to push for an agenda that better fit his own
beliefs. But presidents need tools beyond just ideological
commitment to secure sound policy. 16 Unfortunately, this
87
attitude trapped the second-term staff in a Catch-22: rely
on the polls and disappoint the conservative supporters or
ignore the polls and suffer defeat in Congress.
Conservative Republicans had voted for Reagan in 1980
and 1984 because they believed he was their best chance to
bring family values and a social conservatism back to
America. His inability to deliver on these promises in the
first term set the stage for the problems he encountered in
the second. A seasoned veteran of White House politics and
the hostilities between Congress and the president, Buchanan
took a much more active interest in policy than Gergen.
Buchanan saw himself as the most legitimate voice for the
right wing in the White House, which gave him independent
leverage within the administration and among conservative
party members. Unity between the chief of staff and his
communications director did not exist. This left a critical
gap in the ability to publicize a unified message from the
administration
.
Buchanan's post was supposed to give him a large role
in the daily White House operations. Almost immediately
after his arrival, however, Buchanan showed that he would
have little to do with the daily White House press
operations. The policy-setting role actually permitted
Buchanan to chair weekly Saturday meetings that helped to
drum up support for the Contras. Buchanan also set up
meetings for Reagan with Contra leaders.
Buchanan's push for a conservative agenda in both
domestic and foreign policy often gave rise to tensions
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This conservatismbetween the Regan and Buchanan staffs,
also took away from the unity that had developed in the
first term among the key staff positions. Internal battles,
once easily pacified, intensified. Speechwriters
,
for
example, battled the State Department and Regan's
assistants, who were often denounced as the "mice," while
Buchanan was busy fighting with moderate staff members like
Edward Rollins, who had wanted to use the Office of Public
Liaison to realign voters. Unfortunately for Reagan's
ardent supporters, the focus on re-establishing the
president's conservative agenda led to an overall decline in
the quality of policy promotion. The second term's
rightward shift affected the staff's ability to define
clearly the policies to be promoted.
Buchanan, like his immediate predecessor, had worked
under President Nixon. But there was an obvious contrast
between the political beliefs of Gergen, the former director
of research and writing under Nixon, and Buchanan. Although
each carried to their position their own hard-earned,
Republican credentials, they viewed differently their roles
within both the political party and the White House. These
differences affected how policy was conveyed to the public.
At the time of his appointment, many in the media
immediately asserted that Buchanan would be too outspoken to
hold the job. While he was barely visible in the first few
months on the job, the dormancy did not last long. To
defend his conservatism, Buchanan encouraged speechwriters
to write more hard-hitting presidential speeches and act as
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policy shapers. The speechwriting office "was where the
philosophical, ideological, and political tensions of the
administration got worked out." 17 Buchanan envisioned that
his conservative agenda, mirroring that of the president's,
could be realized by these conservative speechwri ters
.
3 . Speechwrit incr
Buchanan was very pleased with the speechwriting shop
and the media relations personnel that he inherited from
Gergen. Though the development of a typical Reagan speech
followed a routine during the first term, this was disrupted
in the later years by the hostilities between Regan and
Buchanan and their respective offices. The speech would be
drafted and sent to senior staff members to review and make
changes. "In staffing, a speech was sent out to all the
important members of the White House staff and the pertinent
White House offices." 18 In the face of their conflict,
editing a speech in an orderly fashion was a challenge.
The chief of staff tried to remain in control of the
situation. Regan's favorite communicating tool, as always,
was the memo. "It said that major presidential speeches
would now be prepared from an outline approved by the chief
of staff and other senior staff as appropriate." 19 Noonan
said this meant the speechwri ters would simply receive more
criticism because the president would likely sound bad in
his public addresses if non-experts were given more
authority
.
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The type of conservative agenda became a conflict
between Regan's aides, but the real battleground for control
could be found in the speechwriting shop. The new
supervision over the speechwriters created two problems,
Noonan said: an "art problem" and a "policy problem."
Everyone outside the writing shop thought they knew how to
write speeches:
Speechwriting naturally started rows
because debates and arguments would go
on for years but finally at some point
policy had to be announced and
articulated in speeches. 20
The problem was exacerbated under Reagan because the
speechwriters' roles were not clearly defined. The
president did not know the exact views espoused by each
speechwr i ter
. Nor did Reagan control his speechwriters
directly, which could have given him flexibility in the
kinds of messages he wanted to deliver.
Noonan, who arrived as a speechwriter in 1984, got to
see both administrations at work. She believes that the
suggestions from Regan's aides hurt the quality of the
president's message.
in the long run it proved unwise
because it contributed to the
diminution in the grace and
effectiveness of the president's
rhetoric that marked the second
administration
.
21
Effective public communication, Noonan says, should be the
overriding goal of the president - and this includes placing
trust in the speechwriters.
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Noonan says the second-term speechwriting team had
less control over their speeches and did not fare as well in
molding the president's image because of Regan's insistence
that the "mice" review their work. Moderates within the
second administration, such as National Security Adviser
Robert McFarlane and Secretary of State George Shultz, sided
with the dictates of Regan and criticized the speechwri ters
for getting directly involved in the creation of policy.
Both believed that the speechwriters should be writing
presidential speeches free of Buchanan's influence.
Instead, Buchanan encouraged his writers to advance policy
and, simultaneously, promote a more conservative social
agenda. The concerns expressed by Shultz and McFarlane,
Noonan claims, had no validity, because speechwriters make
the words, thus separating speechwriting from policy is
impossible
.
The speechwriting shop became one of the few places
where honest conservative ideas were cultivated, Noonan
says. "And so speechwriting was, for some, the center of
gravity in that administration to the point where ideas and
principles still counted ." 22 Yet despite these principles,
they failed to generate adequate excitement for major
policies. Reagan's dependence on public communication
should have given Buchanan an impetus for better work in the
speechwriting shop. "A few years later Shultz told me
presidential speechwriting worked fine until Pat came along
and ruined it because he was such a right-winger ."' 3 This
shows that the division between hard-core conservatives and
92
the more moderate staff never ended, despite the fact that
pragmatists had left the White House.
C. Expectations
The second-term team came in with optimism that it
could do more for Reagan. While they had no major event to
boost their work, such as Reagan's recovery from the
assassination attempt provided, they felt good about their
chances with the large re-election victory Reagan had
posted. Even discounting polls, there was a good feeling
within the administration.
Though it normally takes time and dedication to
develop an agenda, the new staff members searched for
instant results. The conservative agenda, however, could
not easily go forward without a major issue on which to
complete the possible realignment. "For a couple of years
there was a lot of talk about the [nation's] swing to the
right,'' Daniel Yankelovich wrote in the middle of Reagan's
second term. "It became clear that that was not the case,
though there is [still] a great deal of emphasis on the
country's conservatism." 24 The New York Times had earlier
observed that Reagan had not been blessed with a policy
mandate in the 1984 election. Other political analysts,
too, such as communications expert Robert E. Denton, Jr.,
suggested that Reagan had been re-elected almost exclusively
because of his charm and rhetoric. If these arguments are
correct, then Reagan's advisers were mistaken to encourage
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him to pursue an even more conservative agenda that called
for greater sacrifices from the people.
The political tides, which are under constant flux,
seemed to have stabilized in the 1980's, allowing some
people to believe that Reagan was leading the first
realignment since Franklin D. Roosevelt's in 1932. But
there was no major issue on which the administration could
lead a realignment, despite frequent attempts to find the
right issue. Buchanan proposed that the administration
begin a war on crime. Regan disagreed, opting instead for
tax reform.
D. Results
The unexpected difficulties that Reagan faced during
the second term were symbolized on the day of his second
inauguration when a bitter chill descended on Washington.
This day was truly unlike his first inauguration, which had
bright sunshine and unseasonably warm weather. The cold and
icy day in the nation's capital that forced the scheduled
activities inside was only the beginning of Reagan's
problems. Poor planning efforts showed up early in the
second term, affecting not only the ability to create
policy, but also the ceremonial responsibilities of the
presidency. Reagan always wanted to be in a comfortable,
bright place that allowed his cheery persona to reflect the
setting and garner him public support. But Reagan was
unable to avoid a commitment to speak at the dark atmosphere
of the Bitburg cemetery where young Nazis had been buried 40
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years earlier. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl did not
understand the offense that this would commit. Reagan's
error in judgment angered many Jewish-Americans
,
but
Buchanan, pushing the conservative line, wanted Reagan to go
on the offensive against the critics of the trip and stand
up to the Jewish-American leaders. By never formally
issuing apologies, Buchanan attempted to bring the "real"
Reagan out to the public.
Like Buchanan, Regan took a hard-line stance on
Bitburg to cover for the mistakes the advance unit had made.
The problems caused by Bitburg delayed Regan's planning for
future policy as time elapsed while he answered critics and
smoothed over the problems
. Bitburg compounded the main
concerns that resulted from the 1984 campaign, which
intentionally focused on values instead of issues. For his
entire presidency, Reagan only averaged four policy
proposals a year to Congress. 25 Presidents in their second
terms expect to meet more resistance to their policies. For
the 73 -year-old Reagan, questions abounded as to whether his
skills as a speaker had deteriorated. Both Reagan's status
as a lame-duck president, and his advancing age, in part,
contributed to the failures. Of course, Reagan had
effectively countered Mondale's campaign that age mattered
by claiming that he would not take advantage of the
Democrat's youth and inexperience for political gain.
But the two factors that were most important could not
be seen or were obscured by the election results. First,
Reagan needed suitable assistants to pass policy. Second,
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the victory did not prove to conservatives that the
attitudes of Americans were changing. But opinion surveys
supplied evidence - which could have been heeded as a
warning signal - that there existed a renewed trust in the
federal government and support for its entitlement programs.
Finding a strong issue on which to base the new term was as
much of a challenge. Tax reform, first offered to Congress
in 1983, was brought back to the bargaining table. Urban
enterprise zones, the line-item veto, and prayer in school
were all placed on the second administration's agenda.
Employing solely going-public tactics has never been
enough for any president to obtain his agenda, especially
when it contains many objectives that had failed previously.
Even in 1981 there was enough bargaining to get Reagan's
budget passed. In his second term, Reagan learned that
public appeals may only work for a limited time. After
relying on pressure from representatives' local constituents
to obtain votes in the 1981 budget proceedings, Reagan's
staff expected him to continue this successful strategy. By
1985 the public pressure used to pass Reagan's basic
policies back in 1981 no longer existed. The conservative
agenda allowed people's passion for Reagan's policies to
dissipate even while his popularity remained high.
Conservatives within the administration did not fully
appreciate that Reagan's successes had caused the American
people to become more confident in the federal government.
This unintended effect is clear from separate polls taken in
1981 and 1986. When Reagan took office, 77 percent of those
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polled said the government created more problems than it
solved. By 1986, this number had dipped to 62 percent. 26
Similarly, a March 1985 ABC News/The Washington Post survey
showed that Americans were placing greater trust in the
government. In the poll, 66 percent of respondents said
spending should not be cut for social programs. In February
1982, only 51 percent had agreed with this statement 27
,
though some programs, such as Social Security, always had
received substantial support.
These polls were remarkably different from those of
the early 1980' s. Wirthlin had found, in the 1980 election,
that there were "strong feelings that the scope of
government should be reduced." 28 And in 1981, a 59-35
percent margin said the best government is a government that
governs least. 29 The new statistics should have told the
administration that the foundation of their conservative
program, which relied on voters to support the concept of
reducing the federal government's role, could not be
achieved without enhanced bargaining.
Buchanan thought that Reagan' s continued popularity
could allow the administration to pass its program without
bargaining. Bargaining, though, would have stripped the
communication director's conservative beliefs of meaning.
"Public discussion requires issues to be stylized in ways
that frequently reduce choices to black-and-white
alternatives and to principles that are difficult to
modify." 30 It also hardens the negotiating positions of
each side when compromise must finally be reached.
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Because he had such a good feeling for the president's
future success, Buchanan was more passionate about enhancing
the conservative agenda despite the evidence found in the
polls
:
The Buchanan view - not necessarily
that of the senior staff as a whole -
is that Reagan should speak out on
controversial topics, taking full
advantage of the presidency to ' frame
the issues' in favorable terms. 31
Buchanan hoped to blame Democrats for the budget deficits,
and he labeled opponents of SDI "those who would leave
America defenseless."
With Baker and other moderates no longer in charge,
Congress may not have been willing to bargain with Reagan
anyway. There would have been little advantage for the
legislature to do so. Whether Congress was prepared to
bargain or not, its Democratic members were bolstered by the
polls which could be loosely interpreted as showing
Americans becoming tired with the president's policies. As
Gergen explained in a 1985 U.S, News & World Report article,
the man has been extraordinarily
popular while his agenda has been
falling apart in Congress. And the
public is mostly siding with Congress,
not Reagan
.
32
Reagan's personal popularity helped to "camouflage" how weak
his programs had become, Gergen added. Even Kevin Phillips,
the conservative author, argued that Reagan was moving too
far to the right too swiftly.
Moderates and liberals in Congress benefitted from the
new attitudes, which eventually allowed the Democratic
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leadership to protect the core programs of the New Deal and
oppose foreign policy that was too extreme:
Reagan had won his landslide, but
Congress already understood that he had
no particular mandate from the public
as he had in 1980. Public opinion was
no longer Reagan's monopoly. 33
There were poor poll numbers leading up to the election, but
not enough to raise concern. In a 1984 Harris survey, 66
percent of respondents judged Reagan's nuclear arms
reduction a failure. 34 In addition, 59 percent said his
efforts to help those hardest hit by the recession were
inadequate
.
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So, it is no coincidence that Congress hardened its
resolve just as Democrats were gaining back many of the
House seats that had been lost during Reagan's first term.
And by 1987 there was no longer a Republican Senate
majority. This permitted the 100th Congress to thwart
Reagan by moving to the left, passing laws in areas of fair
housing and welfare reform, enacting bills to aid the
homeless, expanding food-stamp provisions, and enhancing
civil rights at the federal level. House Speaker Jim
Wright, who had replaced Tip O'Neill, said that the needs of
both the working and lower classes had been deferred too
long by Reagan's agenda. The Democrats were finally able to
expand entitlement programs, many of which had been cut or
level funded since 1981. This defined the failures Reagan
encountered. The second term may have been more successful
if Reagan had focused on real issues rather than values,
which was Buchanan's main area of interest.
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Buchanan, unlike Gergen, never controlled the Press
Office. But he did win control of the 36-member staff
Office of Public Liaison from Rollins. Rollins believed
that the office could be best used as a political
realignment tool, but Regan thought it would better function
as a place to "get
- the-word-out .
" Rollins also argued with
Buchanan about how best to sway Congressional votes in
support of the Contras. The political director, like
Wirthlin, believed that arms should be twisted in Congress
to get support as opposed to the going-public strategies.
Buchanan preferred to use a public appeals strategy, showing
a lack of dependence on traditional bargaining and his fear
of wasting potential political capital. Buchanan, though,
was not afraid to pressure Congress:
We don't have to influence the whole
country now. We have to influence 30
or 40 people. . . That calls for a
different type of argument. We've
given all the arguments on why we think
the aid is necessary. Now we've got to
make the argument about what happens if
we don't get it and point out who will
be responsible. 36
The public liaison office was soon being used as a
promotional tool for support of the Contras rather than as
an office designed to listen to the concerns of interest
groups such as women, minorities, and business executives.
The Office of Public Liaison played a key role in the
budget battle of 1981 in getting Reagan's tax policies
through. Buchanan's take over of this office, then,
signalled a further rightward shift in not only the
direction of policy, but in discussions with congressional
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leaders. The liaison office may have influenced some
independents to vote for Reagan, but it did not make the
electorate more conservative.
While Reagan's popularity temporarily increased the
number of Republican supporters, there was no comparable
strengthening of the conservative base of his party in the
first term. Polls showed that the number of Americans
considering themselves conservatives held steady throughout
Reagan's eight years. Reagan was only rewarded with large
election victories because a majority of the swing votes
from conservative Democrats and Independents went to him.
In 1980, for example, Reagan took 41 percent of the
conservative Democratic vote in the three-way race. Ford
managed only 35 percent of this vote four years earlier.
Reagan held a 24 percent margin in independent's voting,
routing Carter 54 percent to 30 percent. 37
Reagan and Buchanan saw realigning voters as a useless
endeavor because it would not improve the short-term success
of the president. A Roper survey, taken between May 16-30,
1987, showed that political ideologies were relatively fixed
in the preceding 10 years. In 1977, 41 percent considered
themselves conservative, This rose to only 44 percent in
1982 and dipped to 43 percent five years later. Those
considering themselves liberals in 1977 accounted for 22
percent of the electorate, falling to 19 percent in 1982 and
rising to 23 percent in 1987. 38
Despite the failure to gain long-term stability, in
March 1987, after his 62nd month in office, Reagan's
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approval ratings still remained higher than those of
Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon at comparable times of their
second terms. But while Reagan's approval ratings continued
to rise nearly two years into his second term, this did not
mean that his policy was popular. These polls did not
adequately indicate Reagan's inability to pass his policy,
or the fact that a moderate agenda had been used to procure
his earlier successes.
The main problem Buchanan faced was that he had no one
from whom he could draw public support for his beliefs.
Policies such as funding the space-based defense system and
the Contras needed this support. As Gergen noted, "The
primary beneficiaries of Reagan's popularity are his fellow
Republicans, far more than his fellow conservatives ." 39
This is in agreement with the attitude change of the
population
.
Falling back on direct appeals, of course, did not
always work. Two of Reagan's most cherished goals,
construction of new MX missiles and the advancement of the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, were initially
defeated by Congress. Though Reagan practiced it rarely, a
president may be able to advance his policy without the
popular sentiments of the American people if he is equally
capable of working within a structure of Congressional
relations. The tax reform proposal that simplified tax
codes was remarkably passed through Congress despite no
major support from either the general population or interest
groups. Reagan's public appeals on the issue fell to deaf
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ears, making it unsuitable for use as a momentum builder,
for political gain, or for realignment purposes. The Reagan
tax proposal, though, was supported by a 49-29 margin in a
June 1985 Gallup poll, and nearly the same margin of people
believed it would make the tax system fairer for all. But
these numbers were far from overwhelming. 40 The concerted
effort of Treasury officials, led by Baker, was what got tax
reform passed. Treasury bargained with Congressional
leaders such as Sen. Bob Packwood, R-Oregon, to get the
reforms in place, defying those who believed it could not be
done .
Maintaining the popularity of the president was not as
important to Regan and Buchanan as increasing the range of
policy that could be advanced. They both felt that the high
approval ratings for the president should allow him to be a
more influential conservative than Wirthlin's polls
indicated. Noonan disliked the polling conducted by
Wirthlin because the polls were supposedly responsive to the
state of the country and thus could influence the content of
her writing. Wirthlin's techniques with regard to audience-
testing specific words, such as his input for State of the
Union addresses, angered Buchanan's speechwri ters . "This
isn't writing; this is one small step for focus groups, one
giant step for the where' s-the-beef -ization of mankind." 41
Despite Regan's insistence that polls did not matter, his
staff used them, Noonan says, to re-write speeches and gain
greater control over their content. Wirthlin did play an
integral role in helping Reagan respond to the American
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people by identifying issues that would resonate with them.
Buchanan felt that he had to go beyond these issues,
however, if he were to accomplish his goals.
The performances of both Regan and Buchanan reflected
how they worked in opposition to each other. Neither Regan
nor Buchanan heeded the warnings of their predecessors in
their respective offices. The politicization of the Office
of Communications, which exchanged the long-range planning
function for an immediate ideological impact on policy
matters, meant that standing up to Congress would be less
effective. Gergen later complained that Buchanan used the
office as a tool for Reagan to veer far to the right. As
Newsweek reported: "Within the White House, Buchanan seeks
the influence of ideas, not bureaucratic turf, consistently
urging a hard conservative line ." 42 But Buchanan would
learn that the purity of his ideas would not be as
influential as Gergen' s public pressure and adequate
planning. Buchanan was not an ineffective communications
director, but he was willing to sacrifice long-term planning
and staff cohesiveness for ideology.
Buchanan' s vision could more easily impact foreign
policy because he faced little obstruction from Congress or
the domestic policy council. "Reagan's slam-bam push for
contra aid was widely regarded in the capital as a personal
victory for the tenacious Buchanan ." 43 Buchanan's basic
problem in his position was his refusal to sacrifice his
views for the greater good of the presidency and his
aversion to being a consensus builder. The independent
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policy stances he already held were bolstered by a loyal
constituency in the Republican party. "He has made of his
office an independent political outpost that has led to two
years of bitter clashes in the Reagan White House." 44
These "clashes" did not help the image of a unified White
House and affected Regan's ability to control the
conservative direction he envisioned.
Many conservatives criticized Buchanan for failing to
rally Congressional support for $100 million in aid for the
Contras in 1985. The Republicans, who lost the House battle
222-210, understood that Buchanan's attitude had hurt their
cause. His op-ed piece in March 1985 that said Democrats
who cast their votes against sending aid to the Contras were
supporting the Soviet Union may have backfired, sealing the
fate of the aid:
Critics say that Buchanan encourages
Reagan's most doctrinaire notions to
the peril of presidential
accomplishment, and that his taste for
strident language and 'demonizing' his
adversaries will undermine the
president's gift for building
consensus . 45
Furthermore, Buchanan advised the president not to place
sanctions on South Africa. In a July 22 speech, he urged
the president to remain firmly anti -Communist by opposing
sanctions that many Americans believed would show support
for the disenfranchised black South Africans. Perhaps Regan
could have better contained Buchanan's impulses. Instead,
Regan was rarely seen and he only controlled the most
extreme of Buchanan's speeches.
105
As chief of staff, Regan failed to protect the
president from the too outspoken and too confrontational
Buchanan. Buchanan was allowed to push a hard line and
change people's perceptions of the president. Buchanan also
advised Reagan not to extradite John Demjanjuk back to
Israel even though he was believed to be a former Nazi.
This could have placated some of the bad feelings engendered
by the fiasco at Bitburg.
The conservative social policy, such as placing limits
on abortion and advancing school prayer, hardly got off the
drawing board. Buchanan endorsed Meese's attempts to put a
conservative stamp on the Supreme Court and in the federal
judicial system. By the end of his time at the White House,
Buchanan was trying to use his influence more and more by
writing editorials rather then working within the system.
This is a sign, Noonan says, that he eventually conceded
defeat because his work was going to waste
.
Buchanan has been lax at administration
and at preserving turf and status for
himself and his employees. He has been
like an absent-minded professor trying
to teach philosophy in a reform
school . 46
Even many Reagan supporters believed that Buchanan's policy
advice frequently backfired on the president.
Reagan had no dramatic triumphs between 1984 and 1986,
as continued economic growth and low inflation were
counterbalanced by budget and trade deficits.
The Presidency is no place for semi-
retirement. The President does best
with a small cadre of assistants, with
flexible assignments and
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responsibilities of both act ion- forcing
and program-building nature. 47
The proper decision-making process was circumvented in the
later Reagan years in order to make sure success at
important items on the agenda, like aiding the Contras, were
achieved
.
The foreign policy arena was where Buchanan finally
embarked on an attempt to leave a conservative impression
after failing to do so on domestic policy. Buchanan felt
that Reagan could promote the social agenda well enough on
his own. SDI was to have used strictly defensive space
weapons to protect the United States against attack.
Questions of its cost, which ranged from $15 to $18 billion
over the 1985 to 1989 time-frame 48 and its actual purpose
meant that it had less chance of success in Congress during
the second term, even though the public indicated they could
support the program. The Iceland summit with Gorbachev
caused frustration for Reagan's conservative allies, who had
hoped the president would strengthen his stance against the
Soviets and not concede to demands in military reductions.
They were backed up by many Americans who felt that Reagan
had not been tough enough on the Soviets.
Buchanan saw additional strength for the SDI after the
Iceland summit with Gorbachev. But there was not enough
enthusiasm to convince Congress that it should spend money
on a weapon better suited for an earlier period of the Cold
War. Congress saw the polls that reflected decreased
support when the cost was taken into account.
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Unfortunately, the arms control
process, like so many of the
Administration's security- related anddomestic initiatives in the early
stages, suffered from the lack of a
disciplined interdepartmental policy-
making structure. 49
Meanwhile, the administration focused on passing the "Star
Wars" space defense program again. But Buchanan hoped to go
further to the right, advocating strict constructionist
Robert Bork for the Supreme Court, stating his opposition to
sanctions against South Africa, and defending military
support for the Contras. Congress tried to resist the
administration's attempts at every turn. Buchanan became
more representative of the administration's goals than
Regan, the person who was supposed to set the agenda.
Public opinion was divided on supporting the Contras.
Everett Carll Ladd points out that people's foreign policy
opinions are often difficult to measure, especially when
monetary cost is taken into account. "Contrary to what
seems to be an increasingly popular myth, Americans do not
warm to figures with whom they have deep policy
disagreements." 50 American do not often feel comfortable
with foreign aid because it is difficult to visualize the
results of the spending. Yet support for helping the
Contras, outside of the likely cost of the plan, did exist.
A poll taken in April 1986 showed a 58-29 percent margin of
people believed that "the U.S. should aid the rebels in
Nicaragua to prevent Communist influence from spreading to
other countries in Central America." 51 That May, Reagan
still had a 70 percent favorable rating among all voters and
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an 82 percent favorable rating among young voters, according
to Wirthlin. 52
A large majority are at once reluctant
to see the United States become deeply
engaged in aiding the Contras - and
opposed to our sitting back while a
Soviet-serving regime is consolidated
in Nicaragua. 53
On June 25, despite the fact that Tip O'Neill continued to
oppose it, a $100 million aid package finally passed the
House, $70 million of which would be used for military
expenditures. When people were asked whether the government
should provide $100 million in aid to help topple the
Nicaraguan government, opposition was 62-25 percent. 54
Almost as many people were against Reagan's request for new
military aid. 55 While there may been a lack of
understanding by the public, this became just one in a line
of many second-term policies that failed to enthuse
passions. On November 25, 1986, the diversion of money to
fund the Contras became public.
The revelations from the Iran-Contra affair and those
included in many staff members' tell-all books combined to
collapse many Americans' faith in Reagan's leadership.
Young voters, though, continued to support Reagan in large
numbers. A CBS News/The New York Times poll from January
1988 showed that Reagan's job performance was approved by 59
percent of those between 18 and 29 years old. Approval
ratings declined with successively older age groups. Those
aged 60 and over only gave him a 41 percent approval rating,
just 4 percent more than those that disapproved. h These
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ratings, however, may have less to do with the
administration moving to the right and more to do with the
possible illegality of their actions. But the poll numbers
had given Reagan the freedom to move in whatever direction
he chose, and he opted to make the Contras a major policy.
In a December 1986 article, Ladd said low poll numbers
did not necessarily mean that Reagan would suffer further
policy setbacks. "In general, Reagan's current approval
ratings are not out of line with those of the first
term." 57 However, the opinions expressed by the American
people would shift in relation to how serious the
allegations about Reagan's knowledge of Iran-Contra became,
Ladd noted.
Ladd is correct that Reagan still could have passed
policy, even with the Iran-Contra affair overshadowing the
remainder of the second term's political agenda. Reagan's
critics used the illegal operation to, at the minimum,
attack him for not properly supervising his staff. Regan
says in his memoirs that Buchanan advised him to disclose
everything about Iran-Contra and to tell the American people
why the action was taken.
Buchanan was asked by Regan in December 1986 to
counter the growing Iran-Contra scandal by praising the
administration and defending the core principles that Reagan
had espoused. But Buchanan again went far beyond what Regan
envisioned. Never one to fear controversy or the public's
wrath, Buchanan proceeded to construct an attack against
ungrateful Republicans, the liberal press, and Congress for
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having criticized Oliver North's actions. The piece,
published in The Washington Post, also called North a hero
and an American patriot. Regan had lost control of the
communications director. "Regan called Buchanan on the
carpet on the day the column was published, but there was
nothing the chief of staff could do to discipline him." 58
Finally, Buchanan decided he would submit his resignation in
March 1987, possibly frustrated that he had failed to impact
the terms of debate. But he had done more than enough to
disrupt Regan's work.
In the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal and his
deteriorating relationship with the Washington-based news
corps, Regan was asked to leave his post at the White House.
Regan' s departure and the subsequent appointment of Howard
Baker as the new chief of staff ushered in a new era for
Reagan's presidency. Howard Baker had worked hard with the
administration to pass Reagan's first budget in 1981. His
appointment was even supported by Gergen in U.S. News &
World Report .
When his legislative goals failed, Reagan refused to
use the presidency in a more constructive way. Regan said
that the president should have issued more vetoes to protect
himself from Congressional policies with which he disagreed.
Reagan could have also used the administrative vehicle of
executive orders to bypass some Congressional resistance.
Yet he issued only 381 executive orders, amounting to an
average of less than 50 per year. 59 This low total for a
modern president, Light says, might mean that Reagan feared
111
But in
jeopardizing his popularity with the electorate,
failing to issue more orders, Reagan compounded his staff's
problems and left the conservative revolution incomplete.
The problems encountered in the second term may have
dampened the public's enthusiasm for the president and his
political agenda, but Americans were generally pleased with
Reagan when he left office. In a poll conducted jointly by
ABC News and The Washington Post on Nov. 8, 1988 (Election
Day)
,
about 43 percent of 23,030 voters said they were
better off economically after Reagan's presidency. Nearly as
many, 38 percent, said they were as well off, while only 19
percent said they were worse off. 60 These poll results
indicate that Reagan had regained some of the support he
lost due to the Iran-Contra scandal, but it was not enough
to translate into political success.
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CHAPTER VI
EVALUATE THESIS: HOW USEFUL IS THIS
The lessons drawn from the experience of the Reagan
administration can be applied to all modern presidents who
depend on external communications. Future presidents may
not be able to capture the audience of the American people
like Reagan did because the political institutions have
probably changed enough to prevent this from happening. The
institutional politics of the 1970's and 1980' s have not
been permanent. In fact, "the presidential dominance of
legislation to which we are all now accustomed is of
relatively recent vintage." 1 And it may already be fading.
The president's upper hand on legislation
disintegrated during the second term because of the key
players' refusal to bargain to pass the conservative
policies and the clouded agenda. But future presidents may
not be able to adapt public rhetoric as well. For the short
term at least, the 104th Congress's House Speaker Newt
Gingrich changed the dynamics of the relationship between
Congress and the president and Congress and its
constituents. For the long term, however, C-SPAN has given
wider coverage to the Congress and its actors, where policy
can be created pending the approval of the president
.
Public communication in the early 1980'
s
played a
large role in the power structure and personal relationships
between the president, the Congress, and the American
public. With a consistent and well -prepared agenda, the
president's diverse audiences knew exactly what to expect
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from him, allowing them to work in unison to achieve the
goals he outlined. However, because Reagan had previously
left much of his agenda to others and then limited the
number of real issues focused on in the 1984 campaign, the
turnover in personnel and the new appointees at the
beginning of the second term created a frustrating situation
that would bring on different results and a new political
direction
.
Herbert Klein, who can justifiably be considered an
expert on White House communications, believes that the need
for good communication skills should enter the president's
decisions when picking staff members:
If I were a new President appointing
government officials the qualification
of strong communications aptitude would
get top priority. A cabinet officer
may be a genius in his own field, but
he must communicate leadership to the
bureaucracy and to the public and press
if he is to be fully effective. 2
Buchanan, however, was too brash and outspoken to
communicate with the American people or the bureaucracy.
These characteristics may have been appealing to some fellow
conservatives, but it did not endear him to the people he
needed to persuade
.
Though promotion of the presidency appears as if it
will remain an integral part of the White House staff's
duties, future presidents should always be prepared to
return to an older style of governing where bargaining with
Congress is more important to one's eventual success. Some
political analysts in the 1970' s and 1980'
s
claimed that it
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was bad for politics when the presidency was the center of
government as institutionalized pluralism - the power to
bargain - declined. Other actors seem to have neutralized
the television advantages usually held by the chief
executive. Gingrich frequently scheduled his own news
conferences to be telecast and played a large role in all
political discussions of the mid-1990's. This has offset
the potential problem some critics have found in a
president's promotional tactics. Maltese claims that there
is a very real threat:
that our ideal of a bold and
deliberative government will be dashed
by timid, self-interested policymakers
who shy away from responsibility for
their own actions and delude themselves
and their constituents with their own
symbolic spectacles. 3
But this would mean that good policy will never be created.
Yet even in Reagan's unsuccessful second term, a major tax
reform plan was passed and the United States' relationship
with the Soviet Union improved.
Had Reagan's second-term staff opted to make use of
bargaining tools to pass controversial policy, rather than
using the more familiar going-public tactics, there would
have been a greater chance of passing an agenda with a more
broad-based conservative imprint. Instead, the staff needed
the American people, who had clearly not been realigned in
1980 or 1984, once again put pressure on Congress.
It is not surprising that the second term was less
successful . Buchanan and Regan both should have expected
this to happen, even in the face of good poll numbers. But
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had they worked together, rather than against each other's
goals, Reagan might have witnessed more successes.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Placing all the blame for the second-term failures on
the actions of the Office of Communications under Patrick
Buchanan may be unfair because second terms tend to be less
successful anyway. It is remarkable, however, that a
president who was still very popular could do so little in
his second term. This happened because the role expectation
placed on Reagan was transformed after the first four years
of his presidency. No longer was he needed to cure the
economic morass or make Americans feel good about
themselves. That had been accomplished. The American
people could take a closer look at his policies.
Despite other factors that helped to impair the second
term, the failure to generate adequate public support for a
conservative agenda and the belief that "letting Reagan be
Reagan" would make his policies more viable were the major
reasons the conservative revolution was never completed.
Buchanan's pursuit of an overly conservative agenda
separated Americans' affection for Reagan the father figure
from Reagan the ideological conservative. The American
people could accept the Reagan agenda - including his
defense program, social positions, and economic views - so
long as they were not asked to give up programs they
expected and demanded.
Buchanan may have been skilled enough to lead the
office, but he compromised the external communications
strategy of the first administration. There was a concerted
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effort to make Reagan's communications more ideological and
to focus on specific rather than general policies, which
undermined the potential for success. Hedrick Smith, the
journalist at The New York Times , criticizes Reagan for
ceding so much power to Regan and Buchanan. "The more any
president is preoccupied with public relations and ceremony,
the more power over the substance of policy he must turn
over to subordinates." 1 This left Reagan vulnerable to the
rightward shift demanded by his communications director and
the advocates in the administration who insisted his public
appeals alone would overcome a less-than-enthusiastic
Congress
.
Administration officials were jubilant over their
victory in the 1984 presidential election and seemed certain
anything could be accomplished. But the internal turmoil
between the chief of staff and the Office of Communications,
caused by the conservative agenda, ruined the efforts of
drafting quality speeches, maintaining a consistent line of
the day, and the policymaking process. The old adage that
one who lives by the sword also dies by the sword applies to
the Reagan administration.
Reagan' s laid-back and removed management style did
not cost him politically during the first term when unity
was a high priority and policy was accomplished. Whether
there was really a decline in Reagan's abilities, his
detachment manifested itself much more severely in the
second term. It became well publicized during the second
term as former administration officials began to write
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books
.
And the eventual loss of control over certain
members of his staff, including Buchanan and those involved
in the Iran-Contra scandal, will remain a haunting reminder
of Reagan's indifference to his leadership role. With or
without the scandals, however, Reagan would not likely have
been able to pass key elements of the conservative agenda
without a greater emphasis on bargaining.
With the support of the American people, though,
Reagan believed that he could turn to foreign policy when
Congress resisted his agenda. Critics correctly blame his
laid-back attitude for the illegal actions that were pursued
in his name, but it was his popularity that gave these
subordinates the opportunity to pursue such a policy.
Because Reagan often did not convey information to his
staff members, establish the goals for the administration,
or assign the tasks of governing, whomever Reagan appointed
as the chief of staff would have an influential role in
policymaking and setting the agenda. But Reagan rarely
backed up Regan's work, permitting the chief of staff and
Buchanan to slug it out on the issues.
Finally, by the middle of the second term, the
institutional politics had changed. Reagan was unable to
influence the legislators like he had in 1981 despite his
continuing mastery over the American people. Buchanan and
Regan were both at fault for not recognizing this.
Yet the long-term reminder of the Reagan presidency
has actually been the yearly deficits rung up under
Stockman's rosy- scenario budget forecasts. One in five
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Americans cited the budget deficit as the most disappointing
outcome of Reagan's performance as president. 2 Reagan left
a $2,683 trillion national debt, nearly three times as large
as when he entered office:
Against this background, Reagan's
acclaimed success and personal
popularity as President posed something
of a political mystery. His promises
were not delivered. His proposals were
shown not to work. His objectives were
not achieved. His policies remained
unpopular
.
3
The explanation, though, is relatively simple. Reagan did a
wonderful job selling his proposals to the American people,
who did not immediately perceive his policies as failures.
Only when a more conservative direction was sought, using
many of the same tactics, did people recognize the
deficiencies in the policy. The gap between rhetoric and
the actual policy had narrowed considerably.
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Notes
1. Smith, The Power Game
. p. 705.
2. Cannon, President Reaaan
. p. 22.
3. Hogan, The Reacran Years
. pp . 37-38.
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